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Hi Steve, I like your posts because they are making a huge difference in respect with the things that Levi & Harmen are trying to embrace for their objectual sake. I have not read any Whitehead and as a bourdieuan i´m rejecting Latour´s preconceived impostures. But your whiteheadian point of view makes a lot of sense to me if i take it in respect with Gregory Bateson´s work, which is also very interesting and profound speaking about processes and differences. For example, like i have said elsewhere: regarding to what Levi constantly refrains about “a difference that makes a difference”, which is a phrase that is meant to be endorsed to Bateson as well, and that is becoming pretty popular in online culture, this difference that makes a difference is of course not an object but, in Bateson´s view: “a bit of information”. Here the idea of ‘a bit’ is referring to a minimal data that passes through a circuit of differenciation that leads to different processes given between systems and their assemblages. So regarding to this notion, we only can have access in our experience to the correspondent idea of things and objects, not merely to the things and objects themselves. In other words, we can only have access to their proper “transformations, impacts and forces” as Bateson puts it, and only experiment the difference that passes through this circuit of differenciation.

Bateson`s deutero-learning points out to the different levels of experiencing environments so to get adapted not by taking into account the objects itself and their problems, but their ‘class’ or their ‘type’. In this respect, he follows Alfred Korzybski´s views on the relation between abstractions and language, where all we can understand is deferred from reality because the latter is always indirect to itself: to this point, the class or type of problems that we experiment through the different environments is always more in ‘quantity’ than the class or the type of problems that we have already learnt, and this is how the differential circuit gets into differential patterns and intensities that are meant to be ‘equalized’ -i like to say, ‘ionized’- so to be embodied in our experience.

To my mind there is no way that recognition may be determinant because the impacts and the forces or events that imply the process are always in their course despite the translation that is meant in things or in objects. Processes do not have as their main objective the recognition of the difference that they make because this difference is already eventual ans is already happening. Any recognition or translation would be, if so, an effect or mere consequence of the process that occurs to form, deform, and transform objectual entities so to animate them as a fact. So considering this batesionian point of view, there could be not any sort of causation. So to endorse the question that objects do encounter each other in a very direct way, i dig that this encounter should be understood as a collutio, an eventual collision of differences that affects ‘the being’ of those objects in their transformational-differential process, but this is never to signify that this encounter would not affect the cognitive relation that we have about them even if we do not have access to their objectual existence.

Comentado por Naxos en:

Problems of Translation

November 25, 2009 at 11:30 am

In fact, in respect to all this situation, Bourdieu even take into account Spinoza`s Politico-Theological Treatise to recommend it to the philosophical hermeneutists adepts as a program that founds (I`m translating here) a truthful science of the cultural oevres, a program that promotes the rupture of the ritual embalmment that endorses any textual canonization, in order to put such oevres into an historical investigation, that shall determine (paraphrasing Bourdieu quote on Spinoza): “not only the life and the habits of the author that wrote it, in which epoch, and for who and with which language such oevre was written, but also to determine in which hands such oevre fell into, who decide admitted it as canonic, etc…”

This all can be read in Bourdieu`s most sober philosophical book, his Pascalien Meditations, specially a chapter entitled “The critique of the scholastic reason”, where he states his famous “radical doubt radicalized” procedure. Something to enjoy http://is.gd/503at

Comentado por Naxos en:

The Play of Fascist Objects: Object-Orientation and Latour

On November 20, 2009 at 7:15 pm

Yeah, i do think that Harman is too honest regarding to his work and with his lack of interest of the social, so blindly honest that he just ends up to reify his rampant naivety. But still this is just a superficial justification that its not acceptable at the end of the day. Yes, he thinks he is doing ontology, but he just wants to avoid the fact that ontology is also a political issue. However, I elsewhere wielded to Levi a rude bourdieusian frontal comment against what he was defending regarding to the distinction between the questions of politics and the questions of ontology. A comment that of course he was not brave enough to publish on his blog: http://is.gd/5000C There i explain how naive is to think that such distinction is an absolute one. There i even bring Heidegger`s historical case, so to demonstrate how the questions of politics do have a lot to do with the questions of ontology. The irony is that i exemplify such case using Bourdieu`s little book on the political ontology of Heidegger, which is meant to demonstrate how Heidegger worked out his idea of ontology to institutionalize his political fascist tendencies in order to construct and reinforce the refractive illusion of an absolute autonomy of the philosophical field. Of course we can perfectly endorse and extend such comment to Harman`s naivety.

Comentado por Naxos en:

The Play of Fascist Objects: Object-Orientation and Latour

On November 20, 2009 at 5:52 pm

Thanks for your words, Kevin Of course, this has a lot to do with intellectual honesty and with the ability to make helpful epistemological ruptures in respect to what we sooner or later presume to be our ‘work’. But mostly with the practical ways we all have to approximate to what we shall understand as our ‘object’ of study. Bourdieu never got tired to insist in this kind of professional reflexivité. I am just trying to wield a bit of his ‘common sense’ here, as i think it is the least thing i can do against Latour`s cynical imposture.

Comentado por Naxos en:

The Play of Fascist Objects: Object-Orientation and Latour

On November 20, 2009 at 3:47 pm

Well yeah, as we have coincide before: the foundational imposture that Latour retains is the source of the problem. But its also worth to mention that neither Harman nor Levi bothered themselves to take Latour`s work critically. Like i have said elsewhere, Latour´s work departures from a very and detailed systematic anti-bourdieusian imposture, say like ‘phantomizing’ Bourdieu´s constructive/conceptual preoccupations. So from this reactive foundation he is doing a cinical counterargumentation of all the work done by Bourdieu, and he keeps on feeding his stands by doing that. Its seems that the position that Latour is occupying between the philosophical and the sociological fields is one of an ideologue who denies the relation that social research is meant to have in respect with other fields of knowledge, and this, in order to presume and to exalt the illusion of an absolute autonomy of the scientific field. But as he does this cynically, those who follow his work without any critical margins are meant to fall into a blinded spot in the exercise of their own practice, while they reproduce it as a naturalized scholastic point of view which gives a ‘fair’ sense of justification to their objectual laboratory. This is what i was trying to say to Nick the other day. So the problem is also the lack of interest in adapting their work into the social research procedures: neither Harman or Levi are much worried to do this in the right way so to contemplate and conceive other critical angles regarding to what is known about the latourian assertions.They don`t do this because it would imply to realize how urgent is it for their sake to drop out a big part of what sustains their work. For instance, as a bourdieusian, its seems to me that they had never triangulate Latour`s work with Bourdieu`s, not even when there is a clear critical struggle underlined between these two sociologues. So they took an unquestioned part on Latour`s favor without knowing the specific and confronted vis a vis details of this very particular struggle, and obviously without getting to know closer the bourdieusian frame of work. The results are evident: blinded spots within their practice that are reproduced through their pragmatic academic and granted commodities. This also means that they may not be aware how they are reproducing specific ideological interests that also might point out to their own social class and habitus) and this, in despite their good intellectual and ontological will. An object-oriented-naivety that ends to be self-oriented while they insist to defend it in they mean to fiercely embrace it.

Comentado por Naxos en:

Fascist Bindings In Latour: The Blinding Glory of Non-Human Agency

On November 20, 2009 at 10:56 am

Hi Kevin: Great. I just want to say that I am kind of intrigued regarding to the critic that you imply here against the ‘flat ontology’ and that the object-oriented defenders (mostly speaking about Levi) are phantomizing to justify their supposed democratic foundment of objects. It comes to my mind how interesting it would be to remark how this specific ‘flatness’ is depotencialized as it does not take into account the parallel that Spinoza traces to demonstrate how that passions-of-the-body are the same than the passions of-the-soul (an operation that makes possible an immanent conceptualization of potentia and that Deleuze explains in the chapter 2 of his Spinoza and expressionism). I mean, Levi keeps on saying that his ontology is a flat one while he cuts the aspects that are related to potency. I just think that maybe this is something that you would also want to retrieve to Spinoza. Thanks

Comentado por Naxos en:

Fascist Bindings In Latour: The Blinding Glory of Non-Human Agency

On November 20, 2009 at 8:36 am

Hi there Fabio and everyone!! just to share this tweet from a friend that pointed out to the question: RT @mosabou Does xkcd share OOP’s vision of objects? http://bit.ly/2Fjrys I know Fabio has a twitter account but he is just feeding his post from there, it would be cool if he just get into the tweet with more enthusiasm I also would like to know if john is tweeting, maybe i guess i am not aware if he has a twitter account of course this one goes also to Carl !! I am very keen to join in twitter all the bloggers meant to create philosophical contents in the blogosphere: the idea is to have an alternative flow of information with different velocities and affects to be shared. Far from underestimating twitter i do want to exalt micro-blogging as a supple line that can be also complementary to blogging. what do say? so far its getting good and interesting if you have any doubt or need technical advice u can always ask @Naxos cheers!

Comentado por Naxos en:

Emergence

November 17, 2009 at 04:15 am

LoudTwitter

Thanks for the resume! it is good to know that the book is worth to be referenced as an illustrative complement. I am keen to read the book without expecting more thanwhat is meant to be expected of a biography, despite all the winks i may find of in respect with certain anecdotical topics.

Comentado por Naxos en:

Some Deleuze anecdotes

Sunday, November 15, 2009 at 10:11 pm

I think there is still no Spanish translation of the book, but i will definitely read it when it comes the time. Despite biographies are not quite on my taste i recognize that gossip (specially if its sexual) is an inherent stratagem in all biographies and also the perfect pretext to keep reading unbored. I am very unpatient with this narrative intrigue of gossip-predestination, though i have read some biographies even Werner Ross´s brick on Nietzsche.

But I have to admit that I am not very sure about Dosse: i have read his books on the history of structuralism and i sincerely found an open journalistic tendency to pour authors even though their relation with structuralism was not very clear. It is also to be noted that Didier Eribon criticized this tendency regarding to Foucault. So I feel that Dosse´s motivation on writing the book may be opportunistic: my hunch is to think that he wrote it precisely because he wanted himself to be considered at the same level than Eribon.

To this point i am intrigued on how Dosse is getting to connect all these anecdotes of Deleuze with Deleuze´s work, which is something that might be expected of a biography. i don´t think that this is an easy task because Deleuze always meant to be neat and sharp on how he never excused his work through his life and personal ocurrencies. This might be the reason why Dosse is intercalating both Deleuze and Guattari biographies: as far as i know, Guattari´s adventures and personal issues were never fully isolated from his intellectual or political activities.

Comentado por Naxos en:

Some Deleuze anecdotes

Sunday, November 15, 2009 at 9:35 pm

Glen, i think you are partly right on what you say about Bourdieu. Though i guess that it should be also attended that the main conceptualization that preoccupied Bourdieu was centered in the notion of the field. This means that he would see in further way the case of Brooker, maybe arguing that Brooker was not equipped to contemplate the broken pot, neither with embodied skills or with the specific symbolic capital that circulates inside the field of archeology: that would mean for him nothing to accuse or to regret there, since Brooker is in fact a TV journalist, so it would be just a question of what is expected from a TV journalist. Since Bourdieu was interested in the logic of the practices and their respectively fields of action, he would address his explanation instead to the specialized occupants of the positions and their trajectory stakes that ‘play’ in such disciplinary field. If Brooker would be an archeologist and would still hold such a ironic views, then it would be a socioanalytical case to consider for Bourdieu. Anyway i have to accept that Bourdieu´s its not the panacea, but his concepts are helpful.

oh well but i am not here to argue against your point, which is a good one. instead i want to underline the beauty implied in the broken pot example. What makes a broken pot to be a broken pot? to be broken or being a pot? The fractured object and its event, what would an archeological expert see through the fracture? is there an event previous to the fracture that is already subjected in the object? if so, what history does that object is telling us? Just to say that the broken pot example is really a good one

Comentado por Naxos en:

Contemplating a Crackpot

November 11, 2009 at 8:10 pm

Hola !! leí un poco la introducción y creo que el título que más justicia le hace a todos es: * “Posthegemony: Affect, Habit, and the Latin American Multitude” Me parece que este titulo hace justicia porque incluye la tendencia spinoziana y la aplicación del enfoque de Negri y Hardt (su multitud) a la cuestión latinoamericana (la cual en ellos es aún muy europea). Pero hay algo enfadoso en lo que te pidieron los editores: la idea que conlleva la palabra “Latin America” alimenta también el centrismo continental por el cual los anglosajones refieren y distinguen a los E.U.A como “America”. Los “americans” siempre son los estadounidenses y Los “latinamericans” siempre son los que restan. En ese sentido, a modo de hacer menos plano y seco el título, yo propondría: * “Posthegemony: Affect, Habit, and the American Multitudo” Así no sólo recuperas el sentido continental de la palabra y rompes la división colonialista american/latinamericans sino también restituyes a Spinoza la potestas de la multitud en términos de multitudo y contra-hobbes. Si es que hay alguna referencia a la multitudo en tu libro, sería perfecto. saludos

Comentado por Naxos en:

subtitles

03 Nov, 2009 – 9:07 pm

RT @Naxos: @nsrnicek ThXs4 it Now I wonder what make u see my claim as correlationism & not bourdieusian relationism, which is out of such trap. In your response you say that I may disagree that there is such an event (galaxies colliding) independent of discourse. I do not: such an event exists as an event and not as an object and we may not have the knowledge to access its reality, but if we get to know its existence and might know something about its reality, then such an event will be political. So the event may not be neither actual nor real, but it could have been existed in time or in our time, if so. Events (beings, objects, entities, or whatelse) that are not political are those that might have existed in time or that may exist but that we just don´t know nor experienced them as such in such existence. Its clear that even if we could get into account not only their factual existence but also something about their reality, such an event could not possible be influenced by our existence and reality. To my taste, your realist argument is twisted and malformed: you are rejecting a reduction that it is not reductive: *ontology is not broader than politics*.

Comentado por Naxos en:

six-propositions

November 1st, 2009 at 5:03 pm

Hi everyone @anodinelite: I liked very much the post ..i also think that Nick´s propositions fall into a greedy reductionism, which is one of the vices of the scholastic view that is reproduced ‘practically’ in many fields of knowledge. @kvond Kevin I don´t think it sounds latourian at all: she is not talking about actors or actants neither about networks, she is talking about fields of knowledge and their strategic relations and tendencies, which is more like bourdieusian. I don´t think all the sociological leads to a greedy reductionism, at least not Bourdieu´s relationism. In fact, i think the problem is that Nick is somehow applying the very infamous early-latourian laboratory operation -or something near that-, so to embrace his standpoints: the 6 propositions are the proof of it.

Comentado por Naxos en:

Politics and greedy reductionism

November 1, 2009 7:08 AM

@nsrnicek RT @nsrnicek Two questions: (1) Are two galaxies colliding in the vast emptiness of space, political? (2) If yes, how?

re:Yes, because such an event was researched so to be known & experienced as a positive knowledge through the technology that is capable to do it, & through the people with the professional skills to determine it as a scientific truth & also as a fact, not only in the history of humanity but specially in the history of the discipline that holds such positive knowledge: technology & people, that are both actually payed with certain funds that would not exist if the colliding event would not be relevant to politics or if such an event would be not political. I am afraid that you are willing to see the event itself as a being that is not conditioned by the humans nor their history nor their politics, that is part of a reality that is natural & independent from them, which is like saying that you only want to see this event in terms of an isolated object. But this objectual reductio which is finally invented on the base of the factual existence of a being which natural reality we are not already sure to know, or that is meant not to be known with the knowledge we have so far, is something too comfortable to take as a human-political-independent reality, mostly if considered that the colliding of two galaxies in the vast emptiness of space is not merely an object but an event that has its own affirmativeness & that might even have its complex reasons to happen, what ever these reasons might be, & therefore because of these complex reasons, it might have lots of relevant relations empowering its own material reality.

The problem is 1) if we are willing to take the question as something eventual that happens in fact, & then when it happens & as we get to know it, it irremediably becomes a political question such as all facts are, or 2) if are we willing to see & to take what we think of such event as an object.The problem is 1) not if such an event exists independently from human reality, the problem is 2) if we are able & capable as researchers to reach the reality of that an object, & i mean not it if we even have the knowledge to understand such an event, but if we have the knowledge-of-the-political-implications of our own specialized knowledge, exercises, practices & disciplines, a) regarding to other kind or related knowledge, exercises, practices & disciplines b) regarding to our fields of action, & of course as well, c) regarding to the people & its social sensibility.

The problem is 1) if we have objectified our position & trajectory in the fields we are working on & have worked on through our careers, regarding to the position & trajectories of our collegues & adversaries who are working in the same fields that we are, even though they might be working in something else, & all this so to avoid e.g. to use & abuse of the knowledge of such an event, even in the exercise of our professional practice, & to make not that knowledge end as a weapon or as an ideological dominancy. All this 2) if it is the case that we have taken the correct routes of our knowledge to understand “objectively” such an event, because it might be the case as well the we might have taken the routes inside our own discipline that would not lead us to understand it, & rather also might have filled us with all kind of pre-notions & pre-sumptions regarding to the object we are referring to, either because of the vices & shortcuts that point to all what we have taken for granted about our knowledge & practice, to what makes the sense of such practice & gives us the scholastic view of it as self-evident & the natural way to do things inside our fields.

#addendum To make the proper objectivification of our position, exercises, & trajectory in our disciplinary fields, its needed to effectuate epistemological ruptures as part of the methodology that would make us approximate to our pretended object: this means that we need to drop out certain & concrete things that are settled in & related to our knowledge & to the knowledge of our practice & discipline, things that we presume useful to make such an approximation. Of course I am not only referring to establish a moral rupture regarding to our personal beliefs & atavisms, but mostly to the embodied skills & schemes that constitute our sense of practice which implies the blinded spots that we all have embodied because all of the obvious things that we have taken for granted while exercising our practice.

Comentado por Naxos en:

twitter.com/Naxos

On Friday 30th October 2009 10:26am

beautiful shots in the eye >>>Via hyper tiling

LoudTwitter

LoudTwitter

Hi, Michael, I read you. I have to say that by introducing Bourdieu to this issue I just to wanted to point out that while doing this OOP practice, and despite you may think that your or anyone else`s politics should not dictate OOP`s ontology: it is the practice by itself that is already dictating it, because doing such practice implies this bourdieuan idea of sense practique: which is referred to all the things that are taken for granted and reproduced blindly in the exercise of such a practice. This points out to the scholastic vices that are reproduced in the philosophical field. So, talking about ethics and politics: it is needed to exercise the objectivification of the practice, instead of exercising the reproduction of the vices it implies, as they are so taken for granted, and this, to objectively avoid their reproduction and institutional perpetuation in the field. The sociology of Bourdieu is relational and allows us to think this problems mostly concerned to the logic of practices. Bourdieu himself denounced all these problems all through his work: and he even talked specifically about the philosophical and the scientific fields. So to my mind, Bourdieu`s work implies a relational ontology that is referred to the social, and that should be considered ontologically. The problem is, that this kind of consideration may imply by now a subversive content inside of the philosophical fields, as it is meant to put on the table the conditions of production of the philosophical discourse.

Comentado por Naxos en:

OOP between Politics and Ethics

October 4, 2009 at 5:01 pm

Hi, I have to say that this issue is very important. I think that any philosophy that wants to deal with ethics and with politics needs to embrace the question “who” and the question “how”, so to let its ontological departure grasp its own ethical status. So who is doing philosophy and how this philosophy is done? What is the ethical status of an ontology and how does this ethical status affects or should affect the philosopher that is formulating it? In the case of any philosophy: would not this ethical status affect the philosopher in the way that it shall be also an applied criteria to who is coining it, and in the sense to let him/her exercise a healthy objectivification of his/her practice, the practice that is actually giving birth to such an ontology? Regarding to the quote that points out to “the claim that questions of ontology are distinct from questions of politics”, and despite it also affirms that such a claim “is not equivalent to a rejection of politics”, i truly think that this statement of distinction should be also questioned by the one who is doing philosophy and that is coining an ontology that hopefully will be further referenced on his/her behalf, mostly if such ontology is pretending to introduce and not avoid the ethical status it implies at the end of the day. To my mind, any ontology that wants to introduce the ethical question and that may want to deal with the questions of politics, in order to not to fall into a naive statements, should start to question this ontological distinction, as this distinction is all the way concerned to these questions as well. In the original post written by Levi Bryant and that is linked here, I made a critical comment regarding to this specific issue, pointing out how Levi falls into this kind of ontological naivety. While the comment was frontal, frank, and with no harsh, unfortunately, Levi decided not to publish it as he meant to take it personal, even though i begged him not to take it like that. Obviously, the comment was certainly criticizing and pointing out, from a perfectly exposed bourdieuan point of view, to the lack objectivification of his practice as a philosopher that proposes (not without a bit of irony to my taste) an object oriented ontology (OOO). So Fabio, just to show how these kind of issues are indeed related to ethical and political struggles (in this case, the unpublished comment is the perfect example of it) I would like to have your permission to post my comment in this section, as it is worth to do so and to read regarding to the issues your are posing here. Anyway i will understand if you consider that it is not the case to go that far. cheers

Comentado por Naxos en:

OOP between Politics and Ethics

October 4, 2009 at 1:02 pm

For me, the sort of dialog I search for is the sort where others bring their own thoughts or associations to the table with respect to their own work, or where productive questions asking for clarification are posed helping me to further develop my thought.

If that is so, why you did not publish the comment i made about the naivety you carry regarding to the questions of ontology and the questions of politics? http://is.gd/3W2wI The comment was clear, neat, and with no harsh: i even asked you take it not as personal, but i guess you did. So we have to say then that your are not interested in comments that are contrary to your assertions and expose such assertions as very prudish and naive in their fault, even if that comment are wielded for your own objective sake. You may want to read it again, Levi http://is.gd/3W2wI and…

I take it that real critical work occurs in articles and books, not in this sort of medium.

If that`s so, why are you defending yourself so fiercely in this sort of medium, investing so much time on it, draining all your abilities and rejecting all the affects that are involved by doing so? Oh well, you might be ascribing yourself to what Graham Harman just posted about the blogosphere interactions and critical interchanges, just like waving him as if you had learnt the lesson through his reprimand. But you have not. You are clearly ashaming him, thats for sure, and you will still. Once more, you may want to remember my comment ( http://is.gd/3W2wI ) as the proof of your Self Oriented Ontological Naivety (SOON).

Comentado por Naxos en:

For Reid

October 4, 2009 at 9:27 am

Levi, I can recognize that the whole defense of your claim is supported by the idea that:

questions of ontology and questions of politics are distinct.

Then you spare a complement to this assertion saying that what this distinction:

entails is that ontological questions are not to be decided on political grounds.

These two assertions, far from being really true, their distinction is just pronouncing something that, in general, is not meant to be taken as something purely related to ontology itself. Of course it is expected from philosophers to take for granted the arguments that give autonomy to their disciplines and practices and that give sense to their views and therefore, while exercising this philosophical practice, that present as such like something meant to be embodied and naturalized, in order of course, to develop academically what they do as they are meant and expected to know how to do it. But in the real world, and to this point any realist ontology is included, to affirm that the mentioned questions are distinct, is something very naive. But why is naive? To say that these questions are distinct is a must-be that can only be applied and can only makes sense to philosophers, of course: as it is a very important and elemental part of the practical interests they share inside their field: the field of philosophical production. But outside this field, in the real word, this issues do not apply nor make the same sense, for example, to a sociologue. If you can notice, this specific issue it is by itself political, it remarks by itself a political ground that is already determining the production of philosophy in academic terms. This means that the autonomy that holds the field of philosophical production is relative and not absolute. The effect of any field of production, in this case, the effect concerned to the inner coercions of the philosophical discourse above the production of philosophical contents (and to my guess, I have to say, that you pronounced perfectly when saying rigorously that

The questions of ontology are internal to ontology.)

..is what gives an objective foundation to the illusion of an absolute autonomy, in order to separate, for example, what it is not philosophical (what is not ascribed to certain philosophical traditions and therefore, is taken as subversive), from what it is philosophical and serves academically to the conservation and perpetuation of the field and its discoursive production and reproduction. This means indeed a double rejection: the rejection of the philosophical contents that recuse the illusion of the absolute autonomy, in one hand, and in the other: the rejection of any other external content which mainly will reduce the philosophical production to the conditions of its own production and reveal all this conservative and rejective mechanisms.

So, as I have said before, its very naive to say that these questions are distinct as if they were distinct by their nature. But why is naive? As i am trying to get clear through this comment, from a discoursive point of view everything is political: this is meant to say, that everything that means something is irreversibly political. So, taking this point of view as valid for the present disoursive departure, would not be ontology something political as well? or better would not be this particular philosophical discipline something political per excellence, as it is meant to mean what is meant to mean (so far, let say, what it mean as “being”)? So again, to say that these questions are distinct is just naive and, as i have explained here, this is the kind of naivety of a philosopher that does not establish the right margins concerning to what he/she do at the time of what he/she says to do, actually, or in other words: the naivety of the philosopher that does not any objectivification of his/her exercise and therefore that is blinded by his/her own sense of practice while he/she is in fact practicing it. Further more, what should be expected at least as something to state with a bit of hesitation (and i cannot read anything of it in your post, on the contrary, you don`t allow anyone to doubt about your primal argument while you reproduce it with rigor and without noticing the intellectual and prude naivety it implies) is to say that the questions of ontology *should be* internal to ontology itself. But we don`t receive that vehement and honest reflection from you as philospher that suits the philosophical investiture (although it could be the inversed situation: i mean, that the philosophical investiture is suiting you from behind without you getting to notice) no! we receive the philosophical subjectiveness brought and sponsored by your lack of objectivification (which is something interesting to get to note for a philosopher that promotes the OOO`s stuff). To this point, considering that you are a sensitive philosopher, I beg you not to take this as an attack to your person, on the contrary: while i am being faithful to my points of views, the points of views that you are starting to know, I am just pointing out to a constructive critic on the table, for you philosophical sake.

So it is still naive to say that these questions are distinct, if we suspect that there might be prominent cases in history as well, where the ontological questions were suspiciously decided by the political questions. I guess the most representative example of this might be Heidegger, but not I am not very sure. As you might know better than me, or might not, i don`t really know (I am not fond on Heidegger`s work, sorry) and while i don`t avoid either that all this kind of strange suggestions can always be refuted as a rumor, which is ok to me (but then again if that is so, it would not change anything of what i just said above): it is well known then even as a rumor, that Heidegger`s philosophy did struggle with his nazi beliefs and commitments, and this was somehow reflected in his ontology. Just to take a possible and a tentative example: one might think that his tendency to germanize traditional philosophical terminologies through a series of almost never ending variations and declinations that the beautiful and ductile German language allows to compose, may be something that show us how his work was influenced by the nazi regime, of course, in order to institutionalize and naturalize their philosophical fascism. Or even out of the text, talking discoursive: his final reactive deception against the vulgarization of nazism, which made him take write and publish other kind of philosophies at the end of his days (on Nietzsche, for example): this is also something that may show us his huge influence in the philosophical institutional academical tendencies (this time for good and in a positive way to philosophy itself, i may say). Anyway if so, this specific case might be examplificatory in both ways i have exposed: in one hand, to say that the distinction between the ontological questions and the political ones is rather the refractive effect of the illusion of an absolute autonomy in the philosophical fields (as Heidegger was, by the way, one of the most prominent institutional sentinels and coiners of academical autonomy, and all his political-ontological mastery points out to build this refractive illusion). And in the other hand: to say that he never could hide his political commitments with nazism (while his infamous reactionary case makes us doubt about the statement that holds that the questions of ontology are purely internal to ontology).

To this point you now might wonder: where in hell all these presumptions that i am sharing here actually come from? I then i answer that they are not presumptions invented by me: all these things that i have written can be read and easy deduced from a very little book titled “The political ontology of Martin Heidegger” wrote by Pierre Bourdieu. So while i know with full certitude how you might not be aware of this book, i thought then how interesting it would be, at any rate of course, to show you how, if we give the bourdieuan point of view the authority it actually deserves, you are deeply and blindly reproducing the ontologically naivety song i have described so far regarding to the questions of ontology and the questions of politics, even with their own supposed “distinctiveness”.

Comentado por Naxos en:

A Brief Note on OOO and Politics

October 2, 2009 at 8:07 pm

Mikhail: Thanks for giving @onticologist the status his work deserves. Thanks for giving us this humourous intellectual enjoyment. You can restore your twitter account any time with the same email address you used when registered the first time. It would be cool to have your rustiness over there again. Come on! PD I am writing this comment while taking a bath, playing the piano and eating pinole

Comentado por Naxos en:

Objectology™ In Action

October 1, 2009 at 5:48 pm

LoudTwitter

Just as a final thought i would like to say that Bateson`s thought keeps on pointing out to the question that those things that are unknown could be known if we learn how to know them, or if we learn how to unlearn the things that we have already learnt about them. I don`t know if this is worth to say that he is agnostic, i guess not. To my mind, the fact that we cannot access to objects or to entities just as they are (or to their *being*) and the fact that we can only access to their transformations instead, if so, it is a condition of knowledge and not its limit. Thanks for the great conversation

Comentado por Naxos en:

Object-Reality Interdependence

24 September 2009 @ 9:53 pm

Hi John

I don`t like to label the thought of a thinker because for me it can only trouble the understanding of his work. It is useful for other kind of practical questions that for me are somehow unnecessary. So I will not be or pretend to be the one to say rightfully anything about that matter, as my way of appropriation is already coined with a different intention and approximation. This consideration is not something personal, it is just the way thought is meant to be deterritorialized, so labeling or trending an author is related to another kind of movement that it presents for me as a regression and therefore I am not willing to exercise. I just want to make this very clear and straight, while there is no intention to be harsh or to dismiss your worries.

What i can say is that in the case of Bateson the problem implied was really never solved for him: he tried to give response to it using Jung`s insights regarding to the pleroma/creatura question. This question leaded him to think such problem, but he never took a concrete standpoint, so for him the problem was not solved. But this is not to say, of course, that he did not solved because of his incompetence, all the contrary: we can take for sure that if he did not solved this matters was either because we don`t have the way to solve them, or because they are not *meant* to be solved (this might be like saying that the problem is deeply related with *meant*). By non taking a standpoint Bateson is given the proper sense to the question, so far: that this problem is the hugest asylum ignorantie of all times for human intelligence, and mostly for scientists. With his non standpoint he suggested that non of the scientific realities that we know so far would solve it. So he gave a lot of anecdotal winks to think that the problem is still not well put, that we *really* don`t have the ways to put it well, and to formulate it in the proper sense.

One of this anecdotal winks is related to his experience with LSD. He said that he experienced LSD just once but personally i find this hard to believe (that`s my very personal and intimate hunch). The important issue to this matter is that he did admitted that he used it once, and to my mind this admission needs to be taken as a complement or a wink to the unsolved problems that we are speaking here. The anecdote is that when he took LSD, while seeing a carnationand hallucinated on it -i cant remember the details, sorry- he said to the person that was with him something like: “This is trivial”. We can say that what ever he was experimenting then was just the way he thought that thought would access to objects and entities without any *real* codification, this is, the way that thought would access to their transformations, impacts and forces (so, if it is trivial is because we can access to them just as they present to our experiencie as patterns and flowing differences). Once again, there is no reason to think that he was naive to this question.

Hope this will help.

cheers

Comentado por Naxos en:

Object-Reality Interdependence

24 September 2009 @ 5:18 am

Your welcome!

I would like just to extend what I can understand about Bateson`s views as they are very interesting to this matters, although they are still very rigidly posed regarding to theory of systems and cybernetics. First of all, i have to make the clarification that, as i remind it, when Bateson says that a difference that makes a difference is a bit of information, he is referring to a “bit” more like a particle or a minimum of data that passes through the circuit, this is, as a flow of differenciation given between systems in the middle of their assemblage. This is to say that, while it may be needed a receiver to traduce such minimum data, the impacts and the forces or events that imply the process will remain on their course (this is like saying that the systems do not have, as their primary goal, the reception of the differences that they produce, as these differences are already “happening”). The receiver would be more like the mere consequence of an effect through the process. So information is not meant to be transmitted as such, it just happens right through the interjection of systems. The fact that there may be entities to receive this information in order to codify and be qualified by their own difference and by their own given difference, is something that has less to do with the process: its just the effect of the process, as this process is simply occurring and forming, deforming, and transforming such entities as the matter of fact that animates their own materiality. So the information resulted must be seen as a part of the existence of such entities, as it is meant to in-form their existence, but not as part of the dynamics of the system that incidentally produce the process that differenciates them as such. Entities may also not be pretty aware of such transformations, as they are inserted in the environment (the system) that gives sense to their differenciations and that leads them also to “be” a part of such a system (this does not mean that the system would crash without them, as all systems are always a part of other systems that are bigger and therefore capable to contend any differenciation or pattern).

What happens in between these dynamic-system-insertions, is what Bateson calls a “mind” or a “mentality”. Just to bring here one of his examples: he says, for instance, that a computer can be a mentality while it is inserted in the intellectual system of a biological system that is inserted in an environmental system of a climate system that is inserted in a planetary system of a solar system inserted in the cosmological system of a universal system of systems (and, all these systems are processing the differenciations of such a mentality, as they are also capable to contend, in respect to their different levels or circuits, the information that such mentality needs to exist). Of course this is very batesonian LOL. (btw, in his book Chaosmosis, Guattari refers to Bateson as one of the first deterritorialized thinkers to think the notion of deterrorialization, although his cybernetics insights were still very anthopocentric).

So, trying to respond to your question, I think that it can only be meaningful to speak of information from the point of view of the receiver, but the receiver is fully dependent of the process where it is inserted as an entity. Information is the difference that makes a difference that happens between the systems where the entity that receives and bolds such difference is inserted. So there is no intentionality here: if an entity is up to interfere with its process, or would pretend to change the system produced by it, it will only interrupt it or block it, in the sense that its own intentionality would be against it, though without bringing any substantial change into the system, and without changing the transformations impacts and forces that give sense to what in fact the entity “really is” through the process implied by such system. What it may change is the reception and codification of the information that is traduced in respect of their own process of differenciation. I guess that this (in)differentiation is what we may call “volition”. We can say that volition and its subsequent interference always would double-bind the process of differenciation and would block the flows of the differential circuit. This actually happens because volition and the double bind situations that it implies, are also a component of the way humans biological systems learn, or to say, of the way the have learnt to learn.

But at the end of the his life, Bateson gave a final definition of a double bind situation, and this definition resolves what clinically is still known as a sort of schizophrenic process: he stated that the double bind situation is related to the way that human biological systems are meant to learn to unlearn what they have learnt, and this points out to take learnship into a further level of experiencie to experiencie the surrounding enviroments where they are inserted in as such. This should be taken so far as the heart of his ecological take, of his ecology of the mind. Of course, this shall be something of interest to everyone, even to Dejan

Comentado por Naxos en:

Object-Reality Interdependence

24 September 2009 @ 2:45 am

Great. Following Gregory Bateson, “a difference that makes a difference” is not an object: regarding to his views “a difference that makes a difference is a bit of information”. So this is to say that we can`t have access to things themselves, we can only have access to their correspondent idea, to the idea of their idea, i.e. to their proper transformations, impacts and forces, and therefore, to the differences that pass through a differential circuit of differenciation. As far as i understand Bateson`s deutero-learnship, this circuit leads to different levels of experiencing environments, as we can get adapted to them only by taking into account not objects and their problems, but their “class” or type. To this matter Bateson follows Korzybski, in the sense that all we can experience and understand is deferred from its reality as language is always indirect to its own self. The class or type of problems that it may present to our experience and that are meant to be experimented through different environments, are always “more” than the class or the type of problems that we have already learnt. This means that the differential circuit would always get into differential patterns and to differential intensities to be equalized & ionized meanwhile they are embodied through experience.

Those were my two cents to the question

cheers

Comentado por Naxos en:

Object-Reality Interdependence

23 September 2009 @ 5:43 am

The point is that I seriously don`t think that you can hold your accusations sticking strictly to the whole frame of work of this specific authors, and I mean envisioning it in such a way to demonstrate the procedure that you have followed to assert the sense that trend them as idealists or anti-realist.

Comentado por Naxos en:

Eliminativism

September 21, 09:43 am