Hola !! leí un poco la introducción y creo que el título que más justicia le hace a todos es: * “Posthegemony: Affect, Habit, and the Latin American Multitude” Me parece que este titulo hace justicia porque incluye la tendencia spinoziana y la aplicación del enfoque de Negri y Hardt (su multitud) a la cuestión latinoamericana (la cual en ellos es aún muy europea). Pero hay algo enfadoso en lo que te pidieron los editores: la idea que conlleva la palabra “Latin America” alimenta también el centrismo continental por el cual los anglosajones refieren y distinguen a los E.U.A como “America”. Los “americans” siempre son los estadounidenses y Los “latinamericans” siempre son los que restan. En ese sentido, a modo de hacer menos plano y seco el título, yo propondría: * “Posthegemony: Affect, Habit, and the American Multitudo” Así no sólo recuperas el sentido continental de la palabra y rompes la división colonialista american/latinamericans sino también restituyes a Spinoza la potestas de la multitud en términos de multitudo y contra-hobbes. Si es que hay alguna referencia a la multitudo en tu libro, sería perfecto. saludos
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- subtitles
- 03 Nov, 2009 – 9:07 pm
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RT @Naxos: @nsrnicek ThXs4 it
Now I wonder what make u see my claim as correlationism & not bourdieusian relationism, which is out of such trap. In your response you say that I may disagree that there is such an event (galaxies colliding) independent of discourse. I do not: such an event exists as an event and not as an object and we may not have the knowledge to access its reality, but if we get to know its existence and might know something about its reality, then such an event will be political. So the event may not be neither actual nor real, but it could have been existed in time or in our time, if so. Events (beings, objects, entities, or whatelse) that are not political are those that might have existed in time or that may exist but that we just don´t know nor experienced them as such in such existence. Its clear that even if we could get into account not only their factual existence but also something about their reality, such an event could not possible be influenced by our existence and reality. To my taste, your realist argument is twisted and malformed: you are rejecting a reduction that it is not reductive: *ontology is not broader than politics*. - Comentado por Naxos en:
- six-propositions
- November 1st, 2009 at 5:03 pm
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Hi everyone @anodinelite: I liked very much the post
..i also think that Nick´s propositions fall into a greedy reductionism, which is one of the vices of the scholastic view that is reproduced ‘practically’ in many fields of knowledge. @kvond Kevin I don´t think it sounds latourian at all: she is not talking about actors or actants neither about networks, she is talking about fields of knowledge and their strategic relations and tendencies, which is more like bourdieusian. I don´t think all the sociological leads to a greedy reductionism, at least not Bourdieu´s relationism. In fact, i think the problem is that Nick is somehow applying the very infamous early-latourian laboratory operation -or something near that-, so to embrace his standpoints: the 6 propositions are the proof of it. - Comentado por Naxos en:
- Politics and greedy reductionism
- November 1, 2009 7:08 AM
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@nsrnicek RT @nsrnicek Two questions: (1) Are two galaxies colliding in the vast emptiness of space, political? (2) If yes, how?
re:Yes, because such an event was researched so to be known & experienced as a positive knowledge through the technology that is capable to do it, & through the people with the professional skills to determine it as a scientific truth & also as a fact, not only in the history of humanity but specially in the history of the discipline that holds such positive knowledge: technology & people, that are both actually payed with certain funds that would not exist if the colliding event would not be relevant to politics or if such an event would be not political. I am afraid that you are willing to see the event itself as a being that is not conditioned by the humans nor their history nor their politics, that is part of a reality that is natural & independent from them, which is like saying that you only want to see this event in terms of an isolated object. But this objectual reductio which is finally invented on the base of the factual existence of a being which natural reality we are not already sure to know, or that is meant not to be known with the knowledge we have so far, is something too comfortable to take as a human-political-independent reality, mostly if considered that the colliding of two galaxies in the vast emptiness of space is not merely an object but an event that has its own affirmativeness & that might even have its complex reasons to happen, what ever these reasons might be, & therefore because of these complex reasons, it might have lots of relevant relations empowering its own material reality.
The problem is 1) if we are willing to take the question as something eventual that happens in fact, & then when it happens & as we get to know it, it irremediably becomes a political question such as all facts are, or 2) if are we willing to see & to take what we think of such event as an object.The problem is 1) not if such an event exists independently from human reality, the problem is 2) if we are able & capable as researchers to reach the reality of that an object, & i mean not it if we even have the knowledge to understand such an event, but if we have the knowledge-of-the-political-implications of our own specialized knowledge, exercises, practices & disciplines, a) regarding to other kind or related knowledge, exercises, practices & disciplines b) regarding to our fields of action, & of course as well, c) regarding to the people & its social sensibility.
The problem is 1) if we have objectified our position & trajectory in the fields we are working on & have worked on through our careers, regarding to the position & trajectories of our collegues & adversaries who are working in the same fields that we are, even though they might be working in something else, & all this so to avoid e.g. to use & abuse of the knowledge of such an event, even in the exercise of our professional practice, & to make not that knowledge end as a weapon or as an ideological dominancy. All this 2) if it is the case that we have taken the correct routes of our knowledge to understand “objectively” such an event, because it might be the case as well the we might have taken the routes inside our own discipline that would not lead us to understand it, & rather also might have filled us with all kind of pre-notions & pre-sumptions regarding to the object we are referring to, either because of the vices & shortcuts that point to all what we have taken for granted about our knowledge & practice, to what makes the sense of such practice & gives us the scholastic view of it as self-evident & the natural way to do things inside our fields.
#addendum To make the proper objectivification of our position, exercises, & trajectory in our disciplinary fields, its needed to effectuate epistemological ruptures as part of the methodology that would make us approximate to our pretended object: this means that we need to drop out certain & concrete things that are settled in & related to our knowledge & to the knowledge of our practice & discipline, things that we presume useful to make such an approximation. Of course I am not only referring to establish a moral rupture regarding to our personal beliefs & atavisms, but mostly to the embodied skills & schemes that constitute our sense of practice which implies the blinded spots that we all have embodied because all of the obvious things that we have taken for granted while exercising our practice.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- twitter.com/Naxos
- On Friday 30th October 2009 10:26am
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Hi, Michael, I read you. I have to say that by introducing Bourdieu to this issue I just to wanted to point out that while doing this OOP practice, and despite you may think that your or anyone else`s politics should not dictate OOP`s ontology: it is the practice by itself that is already dictating it, because doing such practice implies this bourdieuan idea of sense practique: which is referred to all the things that are taken for granted and reproduced blindly in the exercise of such a practice. This points out to the scholastic vices that are reproduced in the philosophical field. So, talking about ethics and politics: it is needed to exercise the objectivification of the practice, instead of exercising the reproduction of the vices it implies, as they are so taken for granted, and this, to objectively avoid their reproduction and institutional perpetuation in the field. The sociology of Bourdieu is relational and allows us to think this problems mostly concerned to the logic of practices. Bourdieu himself denounced all these problems all through his work: and he even talked specifically about the philosophical and the scientific fields. So to my mind, Bourdieu`s work implies a relational ontology that is referred to the social, and that should be considered ontologically. The problem is, that this kind of consideration may imply by now a subversive content inside of the philosophical fields, as it is meant to put on the table the conditions of production of the philosophical discourse.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- OOP between Politics and Ethics
- October 4, 2009 at 5:01 pm
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Hi, I have to say that this issue is very important. I think that any philosophy that wants to deal with ethics and with politics needs to embrace the question “who” and the question “how”, so to let its ontological departure grasp its own ethical status. So who is doing philosophy and how this philosophy is done? What is the ethical status of an ontology and how does this ethical status affects or should affect the philosopher that is formulating it? In the case of any philosophy: would not this ethical status affect the philosopher in the way that it shall be also an applied criteria to who is coining it, and in the sense to let him/her exercise a healthy objectivification of his/her practice, the practice that is actually giving birth to such an ontology? Regarding to the quote that points out to “the claim that questions of ontology are distinct from questions of politics”, and despite it also affirms that such a claim “is not equivalent to a rejection of politics”, i truly think that this statement of distinction should be also questioned by the one who is doing philosophy and that is coining an ontology that hopefully will be further referenced on his/her behalf, mostly if such ontology is pretending to introduce and not avoid the ethical status it implies at the end of the day. To my mind, any ontology that wants to introduce the ethical question and that may want to deal with the questions of politics, in order to not to fall into a naive statements, should start to question this ontological distinction, as this distinction is all the way concerned to these questions as well. In the original post written by Levi Bryant and that is linked here, I made a critical comment regarding to this specific issue, pointing out how Levi falls into this kind of ontological naivety. While the comment was frontal, frank, and with no harsh, unfortunately, Levi decided not to publish it as he meant to take it personal, even though i begged him not to take it like that. Obviously, the comment was certainly criticizing and pointing out, from a perfectly exposed bourdieuan point of view, to the lack objectivification of his practice as a philosopher that proposes (not without a bit of irony to my taste) an object oriented ontology (OOO). So Fabio, just to show how these kind of issues are indeed related to ethical and political struggles (in this case, the unpublished comment is the perfect example of it) I would like to have your permission to post my comment in this section, as it is worth to do so and to read regarding to the issues your are posing here. Anyway i will understand if you consider that it is not the case to go that far. cheers
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- OOP between Politics and Ethics
- October 4, 2009 at 1:02 pm
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For me, the sort of dialog I search for is the sort where others bring their own thoughts or associations to the table with respect to their own work, or where productive questions asking for clarification are posed helping me to further develop my thought.
If that is so, why you did not publish the comment i made about the naivety you carry regarding to the questions of ontology and the questions of politics? http://is.gd/3W2wI The comment was clear, neat, and with no harsh: i even asked you take it not as personal, but i guess you did. So we have to say then that your are not interested in comments that are contrary to your assertions and expose such assertions as very prudish and naive in their fault, even if that comment are wielded for your own objective sake. You may want to read it again, Levi http://is.gd/3W2wI and…
I take it that real critical work occurs in articles and books, not in this sort of medium.
If that`s so, why are you defending yourself so fiercely in this sort of medium, investing so much time on it, draining all your abilities and rejecting all the affects that are involved by doing so? Oh well, you might be ascribing yourself to what Graham Harman just posted about the blogosphere interactions and critical interchanges, just like waving him as if you had learnt the lesson through his reprimand. But you have not. You are clearly ashaming him, thats for sure, and you will still. Once more, you may want to remember my comment ( http://is.gd/3W2wI ) as the proof of your Self Oriented Ontological Naivety (SOON).
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- For Reid
- October 4, 2009 at 9:27 am
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The point is that I seriously don`t think that you can hold your accusations sticking strictly to the whole frame of work of this specific authors, and I mean envisioning it in such a way to demonstrate the procedure that you have followed to assert the sense that trend them as idealists or anti-realist.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 09:43 am
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oh come on, I really can`t match where Foucault holds in such terms what you have asserted, and I feel I have to do so in order to follow closely your presumptions. But if you are going to say that I am trolling this conversation, you can always go back and read my extended comment that i bothered to write as a sign of my good will into the question.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 09:21 am
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ok, right. thanks for the reminder. but what if someone like me that has shown some of the knowledge regarding to these authors, doubt of yours as I am doing now? Is it not worthy to give an extended and detailed argumentation, not to presume it, that`s a surplus of course, but to show and expose the floss of the reasoning that lead to conclude what you only by now are still holding more as a hunch or presumption?
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 07:52 am
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And by the way, regarding to a healthy objetivification of the philosophical practice, that I somehow mentioned and suggested you to contemplate in my first comment, if you don`t mind:
The Scholastic Point of View
http://tinyurl.com/krjekrThis will help to let know that i was not being uncivil at the end of the day:
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 09:18 am
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Besides, I am afraid that you are not quite following me correctly: where did i suggest “that one can only respect a work or body of work when one refrains from disagreeing with it or critiquing it”? I do think that -for disagreeing- it is needed to know the whole work of an author, at least to be serious,and just as a matter of honesty, so to accomplish the right to speak about it, in favor or against him, mostly if such an author is accused and trended without any elaboration.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 08:55 am
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“Foucault holds that we can only relate to being in terms of discourse and power, and cannot know anything of being apart from discourse and power.”
Can you say where exactly he says that so? and I mean, exactly in such terms? i.e “holds”, “being” I cant remember where he says that, and i am very familiar to his work. The terms “being” still sound tricky. We really want to read your foucaultian and bourdieuan style. I did so, would you?
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 08:55 am
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No, I am not.
I am seriously saying that they are not idealist as you accused them.
So, do you think that it is enough just to say -begging us to believe in you words just without any elaboration- that for Foucault and Bourdieu the tricky “being” is not thinkable apart from the human?
Are you capable to elaborate your assertion speaking about what you know about their frame of work, and i mean, taking their whole frame of work, if it happens that you know it and domain it?
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 09:18 am
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Oh well, Levi..
So “being” is like the keyword here is not it? and i mean the *tricky* one. All that i wrote there is like saying that the keyword -that you just imposed to your commentators- just would not fit in the frame of Foucault`s and Bourdieu`s work. “Being” is just out of the question for them. So therefore, I guess we all here tramped in your textual *tricky* “keywords”. OK.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 07:32 am
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ok,
I will try to express why I don`t agree with the accusation of idealism that you wielded to Foucault and to Bourdieu. It should be a good exercise for me. This has to do a lot with the way you utilized such an accusation to make your point, what ever this point was anyway.
For instance, regarding to Foucault`s work, you did not consider that, by the time he was proposing his nietzschean views concerned to The order of things, he was one of the first thinkers to say that the man was a recent invent in history and that as such he will not pervive for too long, or that he will just do as long as the historic block or epoch pervive -as you might know, am referring to the episteme that sediments the knowledge that gives sense to the idea of man-. I guess this is a good argument to say that he was not an idealist. Then, you did not consider how influenced Foucault was in respect to his nietzschean views, mostly, in respect to all what he could say, think and work, regarding to the dissolution of the subject. You did not consider that Foucault was very concerned not to be asked who he was (he famous “don`t ask me who i am”) and, within this concerning, his effort to propose his genealogy as the method to erase the prominence of man, and to think history without such prominence. You did not consider that all this effort leaded him to think and to grasp, as a very novel abstraction by that time, all what he proposed & developed about discoursive practices: for instance, his theory of enunciation, which is kind of difficult to follow -without mentioning the subjectiveness that enunciation meant for him as a sediment of knowledge, mostly speaking about what he referred to discoursive sockets, or to truth as a functor of knowledge that has nothing to do with what any man can say but to the conditions of its possibility, its historical apriori, and all that stuff-. But all this needs to be contextualized properly so to not let us reduce his views through the retrospective effect, and so to happily avoid easy accusations. So, if we consider that all his early efforts were mostly moved by his nietzscheanism (this is to say that his genealogical point of view was also meant to be put on as a practice above the prominence of humanity and its representations, in order to question them through analytical exercise, through an analytical toolbox, a toolbox that lead him also to think power, for instance) and mostly with the idea of the dissolution of the subject and the event in the nietzschean sense (that was by the way against sartrian consciousness and even against levistraussian structure -if so-) if we consider all this, its very easy to find how unfair is to say, at the end of the day, that he was an idealist.
But my rant was not meant to refutate your accusation, even though it is refutable concerning to all this things that i am saying now. My rant was referred to your argumentative and pragmatic manners (and if u dont want to publish this comment because I`m touching this matter, its ok, i understand, -spotting myself here is not quite my goal-, but anyway, I have to say that I will post it in the blog that i have in wordpress, which is a special blog where I collect all my commented stuff on the blogosphere, so it is nothing personal). Regarding to this question , for example: you did not bother to give sense to the effort that Foucault did back then at his time to grasp what we all now know it is his thought, as many times he stated: a thought-in-progress, a thought that never pretended to do objectivist theories, but a thought to put in practice thought itself throughout a variety of analytical departures to think concrete problems. With your accusation you cutted all this sensible foucaultian context, and the reason that u did that is because you are very used to take the work of an author, his thought, and his efforts, as nothing more than a text. You are not very worry to embody what you take of an author, you just use it, which is more like to say, that you don`t know it, but you manage it in a very bureaucratic way. The infamous “what can i do with this phrases, with this assertions, so to feed my textual proposes and demonstrations, so to wield them or not against this or that consideration, so to use it fruitfully to construct or destroy” is something that is for you the order of the day. You are so used to this manners that you don`t even notice this scholastic vice, which by the way, it is perfectly exposed precisely by Bourdieu. Bourdieu criticizes the way scholars reproduce their scholar views as the view that they give sense to their own endogenous & common practices, without doing any healthy objectification of such views an practices.
But why to accuse? what is the point to stigmatize as “fat” to who is “fat”? what for? Is not this a terrible manner to make a point, somehow ad hominen claim to separate tendencies and to take parties just to suit an pompous investiture, just to feed a personal trend negatively by the defect of others? (and I`m not saying that your are accusing as idealist who is actually an idealist, in the case speaking of Foucault or Bourdieu they are not, so to my mind, you are so mistaken for double: 1. using the accusation as a way to demonstrate whatever you need, and 2. accusing who does not deserve such accusations). So, as you abuse of your textual tendencies, as you are doing this in a way of a sort of mercenary textual practice, you are not willing to consider that Foucault and Bourdieu walked rather different paths than the ontological ones: they had social commitments that nowadays are still very up to be respected at any rate. Here your pragmatic response or your axiological blindness would sound like “but i dont care, as i am only interested in ontology”. But this interest of yours is not enough argument to sustain an ethical standpoint to accuse them, it just does not justify the “civility” such accusations. “Oh well, what do you expect, if i can only see thing right through my navel”: this neither justifies your pragmatic manners, nor your ways to state your points: with a little bit of intellectual humbleness you may want to objectify your practice, your textual manners, your intellectual procedures, so to take account of them doing the proper margins, and in other to take the positions that you are willing to take in the philosophical fields, as something that shall be very useful to your ontological concerns. (At this point, you may now say that i am trespassing the line between civility and uncivility: but i am not, am just wielding back to you what is meant to be taken beyond the text, as a foucaultian and bourdieuan point of view: so, as u can see, am putting that in practice here or at least am trying to do so, so to ask you what do you expected of a foucaultian or bourdieuan, if being foucaultian or bourdieuan lead to this way to put things and denounce the blindness that they imply and mean by themself, so to take them better through their own discoursivity and sense of practice?).
In respect to Bourdieu, it is sort of the same considerations that should be applied on his defense, regarding to your manners. But for instance, i can say that he denies to take things that easily. Bourdieu`s work is a constructivism-structuralism, but its also meant to be taken as a strategic relationism: he denies the prominence of the man, as he does not consider any actors or actants in the way that Latour does -thought, am not very familiar with Latour`s standpoints-. Bourdieu proposes socioanalysis using a conceptual machinary that lead us to think and to value the logic of practices, this is, from a very macrosocial point of view. His conceptual frame of work is related to the notion of habitus, in one hand, and to the notion of social field of production, in the other. Now you might say: “gotcha! correlationism!”, yeah it might be, but the dynamics that he proposes between these two conceptualizations are not meant to be taken as something centered in an human ontology. The bourdieuan habitus is a notion meant to rupture with realism naivety, with psychologisms, and with the objectivist positions that cannot reach the logic of the social because they overflow “ontologically” their relations, and when doing so, they also fall into a rampant subjectivity: an endogenous social insight. Certainly, the habitus is a system of relations that is embodied within its practice, a system of skills and schemes, ways of views that are meant to reproduce the know-how of practices in respect to their consequent fields, the fields that are accordant to those skills, schemes, know-hows and social points of view. This is to say, that the habitus breaks with the notion of awareness and intentionality of the actor, the subject and the individual, while it introduces the idea of agent (agency) that can be either singular, collective, or institutional. The habitus has a reproductive component that assemblages with social space in many ways and with its categories (that are also reproduced, and embodied). But the habitus can be shared through different individuals, so to say, that you share the same or similar habitus with any else that has the same or similar trajectory that you have, that has the same or similar conductive patterns of action, that has the same or similar tastes, the same or similar education, that has the same or similar position in the social space -family and parents as its departure- , that went to the same or similar school -and coursed the same or similar lessons-, that frequent the same or similar bars, that presume the same or similar way to think. To this point it is hard to think that could be another guy very similar to Levi Bryant doing the same or similar things that you doing (oh god no please!), but the habitus allows us to comprehend such “coincidences” and to understand, for example, the non spoken criteria to select who is a good candidate to be spoused, or to explain the conditioned reasons of a divorce. As u can see, this is the heart of bourdieuan socioanalysis, and socioanalysis is the main work of Bourdieu: his theories of symbolic power or symbolic violence are just a tasty complement to the whole of his work, as they explain the doxa and its ideologies, etc etc. At this end, the last thing that it is important is if he is an idealist or not, and I am sure that if you would know all this, and take it in consideration, you would not use him as an example to wheel your accusation. The same with Foucault.
So, even if you still manage to demonstrate that they are idealists, which would be something very stubborn to my mind, very forced if so, and even if you manage to demonstrate, of course, with all the proper respect that they deserve about their work, and with all what you might know about such work -giving tribute to your effort, energy and time invested to do so-, and even, with all that you surely know that is left to know or you don`t actually know by now about such work as well -as an exercise of intellectual frankness and humility- even if all that, you will find, at the end of the day, that they were never the good and clear example that you needed to hold your disparaged points. So, as you might see, this is were honesty and unwillingness should be admitted or not as part of the scene.
So this is my take on the question. I hope this writing is enough to stand some points, and forgive my broken english.
cheers
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 07:09 am
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Oh well, no surprise. It is needed be brave and to publish the kind of comments that reveal all the unwillingness of your blogging manners and all your lack of seriousness with philosophy. The one I sent you a few hours ago is one of those ( http://is.gd/3toCI ). Of course you would not publish it because it has no real textual content that you can twist and turn into the usual replying boomerangs that you like to wield to your readers. You may feel kind of frustrated, as usual. This was of course premeditated on my part, as i was referring discoursively not to the great Text that you are always pleased to reterritorialize, but to your reactive and resentful blogging manners that characterize your person. Your are too predictable, mister, nothing brave:
RT @Naxos: of course, he will not, but lets see if Mr. Levi Bryant has the balls to publish my comment http://is.gd/3toCI
about 2 hours ago from webYou may want to back off doing prudish assertions about the philosophers that horrify your OOO explorations and that you don`t know or even manage, and I mean Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze, Foucault, and Bourdieu. Just as a healthy recourse and for the sake of your own intellectual trajectory.
You may not take this addendum as a comment.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 20, 12:52 am
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To acuse Foucault or Bourdieu of idealism is simply not knowing what their work was all about. For instance, Foucault`s work is not only referred to power: in the case of such thinker, it is needed to have a broader idea, the whole picture of his work, so to trace the movement of his thought-in-progress that brought all sort of problems into the table. Once again you dismiss what other philosophers have said about Foucault`s work (eg. Deleuze). You may have read a lot of him, but to conclude that he is an idealist is also to conclude that you have wasted your time reading him as you did not understand anything of his genealogies. While you are not capable of giving the sense of what you have studied about him, at the time that what you have said does not show anything of it, we can think that you are just not being honest about what u know of him.
If it is the case that u could speak about the whole work of an author doing the proper digestions about what their different thought are all about, then we can give some credit to your great tout-court assertions. Meanwhile we can take this statements -as well as many others- as just a pretext to hold your decontextualized points, as the pragmatic manner to give your arguments the effect of a temperated reasoning, on the way to feed your OOO presumptions. This is like very cheaty for you and for anyone.
The same can be said concerning to what you said about Bourdieu`s work. I am pretty sure that you have no idea of his work,. that you don`t understand nothing about it, and that your are just using him as an example of what you cannot demostrate with arguments. But you felt confident to put him near Foucault to insist in the dismissive effect of your re-textualized reasoning (as you thought that any of your readers would not complain).
To my mind, you speak and write too much, your paranoic race to get things written and to demonstrate your points within this reactive blogging manners just can show us all the lack of patient and digestion you have regarding to authors and their work.
For example, you insist in saying that your ontology is deleuzian, and you defend it as a flat ontology. But there are not signs of any spinozian influence in your idea of flatness. You might say, “Oh but I am not interested” “Oh, but my work goes in another direction” “Oh, i don`t give a damn”. This pragmatic sense of doing things is the lowest way to do philosophy: this form of “what to do with an author” or “what shall I write about this work that I don`t even quite understand nor find useful to my selfish concretions”, all this way to utilize the substantial materials of thought, makes philosophy a selfish joke. I guess that`s why most of your readers enjoy reading your post as a soap opera or as a philosophical morbosity. Personally i enjoy all your philosophical blockages.
But to say that your ontology is deleuzian, and to claim it seriously as something worth to appropriate as yours, you have to be delezean, my friend: you have to embody the minimum of deleuzian experiencie in your life, if so. But your are not a bit deleuzian, your are fully lacanian. How can you compose and conciliate your lacanian influence with the assertion that your ontology is a flat and delezean one, if you just keep cutting the influences that leaded Deleuze to speak about immanence in the most spinozian way? You really must be joking, its never to late to accept it.
If u want to hold and embrace your ontology as flat and as deleuzian as you insist fiercely to say, you should take seriously the spinonizan influence on Deleuze and not to fake it in their name. Or for instance, at least, you can give some sense to the part II of his book on Spinoza and expressionism, where he states all the basic lines to understand and to work on any flat ontology.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 19, 9:46 am
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Under protest. The article is not worth at any rate, and it is not interesting at all. The article is lame and oportunistic, it centers the critic against Foucault in a single text taking conveniently out of context the whole foucaultian perspective. its no surprise to find such articles criticizing Foucault partially just to get opinative & spot some selfish points on purpose of a fashionable topic, in this case, the heath care isssues. I´m under protest because the article is not worth to be posted here. Under protest because its easy to see that the article is reactive against Foucault for free.
cheers
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Madness and marginalization
- September 3rd, 2009 at 12:58 pm
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Oh thanks for the quotation!! Its very interesting indeed, but am afraid that it is still not quite clear for me why the fact that everything has already happened leads to the fact that everything is already dead. It does not make that much sense if we think about it beyond what is written. Yes my death is ‘a fact in the time of creation’, but am not dead now. What would happen if we take very literally the fact that we are not already dead? Can we do so literally even though our death is something that has already happened? Of course we can. The event of life as a fact has nothing to do with my death nor with my factual non-existence. Lets say that they don’t share the same event-horizon: fact & death are not homologable or comparable as death is just a ‘type’ or a ‘class’ of fact. It is very important in a very human scale, but it is not in the cosmic or the infinite scale. So we cannot take them as the same thing at the same level: death is not even important if we consider the scale of ‘the solar catastrophe’ mentioned by Brassier. Far from what any text can say, we are literally alive and not already death: this is the fact that should concerns to us in terms of we ‘already living’, as ‘we’ are still talking about our own lives, at this very moment, even thought we are saying or writing about philosophy, and mostly if we consider ourselves as philosophers. I know its not very orthodox & that is still roughly expressed, but this is my ‘reasoning’ ;-P I think am thinking this matter as an affirmation of life, regarding to the event of creation, and considering what i understand about Nietzsche & vitalism. So i can´t see any nihilism around this question, not yet. Thanks for letting me express my thoughts, am not trying to convince anyone here, am just sharing my non-elaborated views in other to learn a bit more about all this things, so i truely appreciate this opportunity to territorialize & exercise my english. i hope am not disturbing anyone by doing so ;-P cheers
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Transcendental Nihilism?: Teleology and Messianism in Brassier
- August 20, 2009 at 1:55 am
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Hi Michael, of course i have not read any Brassier, but these days i have heard so many things about him that am getting a bit interested. Although being totally sincere as i am understanding this: lets say that the creation of the universe was consumed in an instant, in a very big but also unique ‘flame’, just like a singular puf! that happens suddenly as a great and very quick combustion. The creation in an instant. The we can say that we all are still trapped in time there, & in first place. But this does not mean that everything is already death, all the contrary. We are not dead yet, thats for sure. We know the fact that we are going to die, that we are somehow actually dying in time. But cannot know that we are already dead. The fact that everything has happened does not lead us to the fact that everything has already died. To my mind this is not meant to be taken as a contradiction, as it is just ’single’ fact. The greatest one of course. but am still learning here, thanks for sharing
cheers - Comentado por Naxos en:
- Transcendental Nihilism?: Teleology and Messianism in Brassier
- August 19, 2009 at 11:23 pm
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Well, should be interesting, of course, but i don`t really know. So far I`ve always considered vitalism through a very flat ontology. Maybe it is the case that such rejection is like to use a bit of zizekian lacanian hegelian own poison, so to get cured of being zizekian, lacanian or hegelian. Makes sense, but I cannot tell for sure
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Monsters, Demons and Partial Objects
- June 4, 2009 at 9:08 pm
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@m_emelianov LOL! thanks for this, I really thought I was being too grumpy about Graham´s blogging manners. I even tried to recommend him to use twitter ( fortunately I store all my conversations on blogosphere >> http://bit.ly/YDK0r ) but finally he just got on my nerve ( & I did rant about it >> http://bit.ly/2pz4Xl ). I still think that he blogs too much, without any consideration to his readers, & to my taste this is like using his blog like a toilette.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Speculative Realism Strikes Back.
- April 14, 2009 5:50 AM
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As a dilletant I think that Frames/sing has become the most challenging blog to read on the philosophical blogosphere. Kvon´s spinozian influence gives him a very privileged point of view over others philo-bloggers that like to be spotted and that are only regurgitating their ontological terminologies. I think Kvons dissertation about speculative unrealism is convincing, but sometimes I think that he gives too much attention to what Harman or Levi write about. As I guess, they dont quite get any satisfaction with vitalism, and while mortifying their lives, they dont quite know what to do with Spinoza, Nietzsche, or Deleuze. I think Kvon has already realized that struggling with them leads discussion to a sad nowhere.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- kvond’s spinoza
- April 11, 2009 8:14 PM
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Graham, maybe you should consider to open a Twitter account & tweet your tinyposts there, surely it will let you save time without giving up any current conversation (you can even post & replies tweets using your mobile device). I have no doubt that your readers & partners will follow you there so you can contact them faster and closer. There are many twitterees interested in philosophy & maybe in a short while Speculative Realism discussion will get more popular & wellknown if exposed.
If you are interested, here is the link: http://tinyurl.com/tc53j ..if you need any advice I can help: http://tinyurl.com/dzavme – Meanwhile if you decide to try it I can recommend you to follow (as far as I know): @Reidkane from Planomenology, @jbmurray from Posthegemony, @domfox from Codepoetix, @parodycenter, @shaviro ( @zizekspeaks which seems to be the “real” one, LOL) and of course should be many more..
I think Twitter is the best way to stay in touch with a bunch of ppl at a time & the best way to post tiny-winnie-micro-maybe.not.so.irrelevant-posts
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- “coincidence?”
- February 17, 2009 1:14am
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Vaya!! De pronto leo que escribí “puta y llana rajatabla” cuando quería decir “pura y llana” como usualmente se dice
Quisiera adjudicar tal errata a un desacierto dígito al teclear acostado en mi lap-top, sin embargo, dado que no quedó tan mal y terminó por resonar bastante bien, diré tan sólo que fue un lapsus afortunatus 
saludos
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- El simulador académico
- 25 agosto 2008 11:20pm
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Una vez leí que despotricaba en el mismo tono contra Foucault tachandolo de farsante y charlatán, en un acto-reflejo que evitaba poner en evidencia su ignorancia respecto a la obra del pensaor francés. Comparto acá el fragmento sólo para ponerle pimienta al asunto:
-Hay un texto de Foucault…
MB- ¿ De quién?
-De Foucault
MB- Ay…, por favor, hablemos en serio.
-Él hace una distinción entre el intelectual específico y el intelectual universal…
MB- No me interesa discutir sobre Foucault, es un charlatán. Es una pérdida de tiempo. ¿Por qué no leen a gente seria?
-La referencia a Foucault era simplemente para preguntarle acerca del rol de los intelectuales hoy en día.
MB- El primer rol es buscar la verdad. El segundo es difundirla. Es decir, investigar y enseñar. Si no investigan auténticamente y si lo que enseñan son pavadas, entonces no son intelectuales, son farsantes.
-¿Qué opina de los intelectuales en las ciencias sociales?
MB- Dentro de los estudios sociales hay gente seria y hay charlatanes como Derridá, Foucault, Habermas, Castells, entre muchos otros. Ellos hablan y hablan, pero nunca hacen investigación empírica, y no digamos teórica. No es gente seria. Además, son casi todos irracionalistas, anticientíficos. Por ejemplo, Habermas es hermeneútico, todo lo contrario a la ciencia.
-¿Qué opina de la posmodernidad?
MB- Es irracionalismo. Es la tentativa de volver a la época anterior a la Ilustración.
-¿Y por qué cree que tiene bastante eco?
MB- Porque es fácil. Es mucho más fácil denostar contra la razón que afilarla y usarla. Es el camino de los haraganes. Creo que hay que ser pre – posmodernos. Hay que volver al siglo XVIII, es decir a la IlustraciónEn fin, sería poco decir que Bunge dice todas estas cosas porque está viejito: además de ello, las dice sistemáticamente con el cinismo de no haber leído a los autores que critica, en función de cumplir de cajón con su anquilosada y burocrática función de centinela de la ciencia: los autores que critica son pensadores que de algún modo un otro han podido arrojar en su obra cierta sospecha contra las instituciones y en conjunto, cuestionar la autonomía del campo de la ciencia: lo de Bunge es una simple toma de postura que apela a su investidura de científico reconocido para descalificar la penetración que la filosofía ha hecho en los últimos años al campo de la ciencia, una penetración que cuestiona la jerarquía que la ciencia se ha adjudicado sobre las demás ciencias, sobre todo, las ciencias sociales . En fin, es un tema que ya da un poco de cansina elaborar, sin embargo, hay que dejar claro que este rechazo y descalificación en bloque de la obra y pensamiento de estos autores es la puta y llana rajatabla de una falacia ad hominen que termina por volcarse sobre el propio Bunge, cumpliendo el adagio que reza que el verdadero charlantán es siempre quien cae por su propia boca justo al acusar a otros de charlatanería.
Por cierto, el articulo completo se puede leer aquí:
http://www.elsantafesino.com/2001/06/02/182 - Comentado por Naxos en:
- El simulador académico
- 25 agisto 2008 11:09pm
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Por mi parte te felicito, pero no tanto por los 100, sino por lo otro..
saludos
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- “Un 28…”
- 4 de julio de 2008 11:54pm
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adr
- Muy de acuerdo con Iván, interesante la cuestión de que se hace uno más exigente, y de hecho hasta se rompe cierto halo de representatividad en los libros, ese halo por el cual muchos autores muy malos ensalzan la presunción de haber escrito un muy mal libro. Si llevamos esta consideración al límite, la red absorbería toda aquella intención de escribir contenidos pasajeros, de poca perduración en el tiempo, de esos que se difuminan a sí mismos en la historia y en sus circunstancias, para después pasar desapercibidos y tender a deshecho. Quizá los grandes libros ya escritos vayan a sobrevivir y revivir con especial fulgor, sin embargo, las empresas para escribir libros que sean más de medio pelo serán vistas como demasiado ambiciosas.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Google nos hace estúpidos… (menos a mi)
- 25 de junio 2008 3:40 pm
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adr
- Sin duda, cuando se apela a la estupidez con un “nosotros” hay de inmediato un efecto revertido y una proyección de la ignorancia que media el sentido común, acaso Google puede ser visto como una codificación del sentido común y de su reproducción. Pero como te lo comenté alguna vez, la cuestión es más del tiempo y del modo de apropiación de lo que se lee. Hay que esperar que las nuevas generaciones que leen digitalmente no tengan la paciencia ya de leer un buen libro, de templarse con él y de automoldearse en ese aprendizaje. Lo que hay que esperar es que quieran hacerse de esos saberes de la forma más hipodérmica posible, sin ese recurso disciplinario, y si pudieran conectarse un chip a la cabeza para insertarse un paquete de datos lo harían sin chistar -yo mismo lo haría-. La cuestión de la inteligencia va por otro camino y tiene otras implicaciones. Nada qué ver con la red o con Google. La inteligencia implica el pensamiento, y éste implica el tiempo. No es suficiente valerse de la ironía o del sarcasmo estilístico, como hace Piscitelli, para darle efecto a la inteligencia. El aprendizaje en la red es una cuestión de sentido práctico, pero éste no es suficiente para evitar que la idiotez se trepe, porque la idiotez no es privativa de la red, la idiotez no es un dato, sino el revestimento del sentido común. Quizá el hit de Google sea binarizarlo y codificarlo para que se ilustre un poco y filtre la idiotez que no deja de mediar.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Google nos hace estúpidos… (menos a mi
- 24 de junio 2008 1:23 pm
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