Levi, I can recognize that the whole defense of your claim is supported by the idea that:
questions of ontology and questions of politics are distinct.
Then you spare a complement to this assertion saying that what this distinction:
entails is that ontological questions are not to be decided on political grounds.
These two assertions, far from being really true, their distinction is just pronouncing something that, in general, is not meant to be taken as something purely related to ontology itself. Of course it is expected from philosophers to take for granted the arguments that give autonomy to their disciplines and practices and that give sense to their views and therefore, while exercising this philosophical practice, that present as such like something meant to be embodied and naturalized, in order of course, to develop academically what they do as they are meant and expected to know how to do it. But in the real world, and to this point any realist ontology is included, to affirm that the mentioned questions are distinct, is something very naive. But why is naive? To say that these questions are distinct is a must-be that can only be applied and can only makes sense to philosophers, of course: as it is a very important and elemental part of the practical interests they share inside their field: the field of philosophical production. But outside this field, in the real word, this issues do not apply nor make the same sense, for example, to a sociologue. If you can notice, this specific issue it is by itself political, it remarks by itself a political ground that is already determining the production of philosophy in academic terms. This means that the autonomy that holds the field of philosophical production is relative and not absolute. The effect of any field of production, in this case, the effect concerned to the inner coercions of the philosophical discourse above the production of philosophical contents (and to my guess, I have to say, that you pronounced perfectly when saying rigorously that
The questions of ontology are internal to ontology.)
..is what gives an objective foundation to the illusion of an absolute autonomy, in order to separate, for example, what it is not philosophical (what is not ascribed to certain philosophical traditions and therefore, is taken as subversive), from what it is philosophical and serves academically to the conservation and perpetuation of the field and its discoursive production and reproduction. This means indeed a double rejection: the rejection of the philosophical contents that recuse the illusion of the absolute autonomy, in one hand, and in the other: the rejection of any other external content which mainly will reduce the philosophical production to the conditions of its own production and reveal all this conservative and rejective mechanisms.
So, as I have said before, its very naive to say that these questions are distinct as if they were distinct by their nature. But why is naive? As i am trying to get clear through this comment, from a discoursive point of view everything is political: this is meant to say, that everything that means something is irreversibly political. So, taking this point of view as valid for the present disoursive departure, would not be ontology something political as well? or better would not be this particular philosophical discipline something political per excellence, as it is meant to mean what is meant to mean (so far, let say, what it mean as “being”)? So again, to say that these questions are distinct is just naive and, as i have explained here, this is the kind of naivety of a philosopher that does not establish the right margins concerning to what he/she do at the time of what he/she says to do, actually, or in other words: the naivety of the philosopher that does not any objectivification of his/her exercise and therefore that is blinded by his/her own sense of practice while he/she is in fact practicing it. Further more, what should be expected at least as something to state with a bit of hesitation (and i cannot read anything of it in your post, on the contrary, you don`t allow anyone to doubt about your primal argument while you reproduce it with rigor and without noticing the intellectual and prude naivety it implies) is to say that the questions of ontology *should be* internal to ontology itself. But we don`t receive that vehement and honest reflection from you as philospher that suits the philosophical investiture (although it could be the inversed situation: i mean, that the philosophical investiture is suiting you from behind without you getting to notice) no! we receive the philosophical subjectiveness brought and sponsored by your lack of objectivification (which is something interesting to get to note for a philosopher that promotes the OOO`s stuff). To this point, considering that you are a sensitive philosopher, I beg you not to take this as an attack to your person, on the contrary: while i am being faithful to my points of views, the points of views that you are starting to know, I am just pointing out to a constructive critic on the table, for you philosophical sake.
So it is still naive to say that these questions are distinct, if we suspect that there might be prominent cases in history as well, where the ontological questions were suspiciously decided by the political questions. I guess the most representative example of this might be Heidegger, but not I am not very sure. As you might know better than me, or might not, i don`t really know (I am not fond on Heidegger`s work, sorry) and while i don`t avoid either that all this kind of strange suggestions can always be refuted as a rumor, which is ok to me (but then again if that is so, it would not change anything of what i just said above): it is well known then even as a rumor, that Heidegger`s philosophy did struggle with his nazi beliefs and commitments, and this was somehow reflected in his ontology. Just to take a possible and a tentative example: one might think that his tendency to germanize traditional philosophical terminologies through a series of almost never ending variations and declinations that the beautiful and ductile German language allows to compose, may be something that show us how his work was influenced by the nazi regime, of course, in order to institutionalize and naturalize their philosophical fascism. Or even out of the text, talking discoursive: his final reactive deception against the vulgarization of nazism, which made him take write and publish other kind of philosophies at the end of his days (on Nietzsche, for example): this is also something that may show us his huge influence in the philosophical institutional academical tendencies (this time for good and in a positive way to philosophy itself, i may say). Anyway if so, this specific case might be examplificatory in both ways i have exposed: in one hand, to say that the distinction between the ontological questions and the political ones is rather the refractive effect of the illusion of an absolute autonomy in the philosophical fields (as Heidegger was, by the way, one of the most prominent institutional sentinels and coiners of academical autonomy, and all his political-ontological mastery points out to build this refractive illusion). And in the other hand: to say that he never could hide his political commitments with nazism (while his infamous reactionary case makes us doubt about the statement that holds that the questions of ontology are purely internal to ontology).
To this point you now might wonder: where in hell all these presumptions that i am sharing here actually come from? I then i answer that they are not presumptions invented by me: all these things that i have written can be read and easy deduced from a very little book titled “The political ontology of Martin Heidegger” wrote by Pierre Bourdieu. So while i know with full certitude how you might not be aware of this book, i thought then how interesting it would be, at any rate of course, to show you how, if we give the bourdieuan point of view the authority it actually deserves, you are deeply and blindly reproducing the ontologically naivety song i have described so far regarding to the questions of ontology and the questions of politics, even with their own supposed “distinctiveness”.
of course this one goes also to Carl !! I am very keen to join in twitter all the bloggers meant to create philosophical contents in the blogosphere: the idea is to have an alternative flow of information with different velocities and affects to be shared. Far from underestimating twitter i do want to exalt micro-blogging as a supple line that can be also complementary to blogging. what do say? so far its getting good and interesting 
...
