Hola !! leí un poco la introducción y creo que el título que más justicia le hace a todos es: * “Posthegemony: Affect, Habit, and the Latin American Multitude” Me parece que este titulo hace justicia porque incluye la tendencia spinoziana y la aplicación del enfoque de Negri y Hardt (su multitud) a la cuestión latinoamericana (la cual en ellos es aún muy europea). Pero hay algo enfadoso en lo que te pidieron los editores: la idea que conlleva la palabra “Latin America” alimenta también el centrismo continental por el cual los anglosajones refieren y distinguen a los E.U.A como “America”. Los “americans” siempre son los estadounidenses y Los “latinamericans” siempre son los que restan. En ese sentido, a modo de hacer menos plano y seco el título, yo propondría: * “Posthegemony: Affect, Habit, and the American Multitudo” Así no sólo recuperas el sentido continental de la palabra y rompes la división colonialista american/latinamericans sino también restituyes a Spinoza la potestas de la multitud en términos de multitudo y contra-hobbes. Si es que hay alguna referencia a la multitudo en tu libro, sería perfecto. saludos
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- subtitles
- 03 Nov, 2009 – 9:07 pm
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RT @Naxos: @nsrnicek ThXs4 it
Now I wonder what make u see my claim as correlationism & not bourdieusian relationism, which is out of such trap. In your response you say that I may disagree that there is such an event (galaxies colliding) independent of discourse. I do not: such an event exists as an event and not as an object and we may not have the knowledge to access its reality, but if we get to know its existence and might know something about its reality, then such an event will be political. So the event may not be neither actual nor real, but it could have been existed in time or in our time, if so. Events (beings, objects, entities, or whatelse) that are not political are those that might have existed in time or that may exist but that we just don´t know nor experienced them as such in such existence. Its clear that even if we could get into account not only their factual existence but also something about their reality, such an event could not possible be influenced by our existence and reality. To my taste, your realist argument is twisted and malformed: you are rejecting a reduction that it is not reductive: *ontology is not broader than politics*. - Comentado por Naxos en:
- six-propositions
- November 1st, 2009 at 5:03 pm
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Hi everyone @anodinelite: I liked very much the post
..i also think that Nick´s propositions fall into a greedy reductionism, which is one of the vices of the scholastic view that is reproduced ‘practically’ in many fields of knowledge. @kvond Kevin I don´t think it sounds latourian at all: she is not talking about actors or actants neither about networks, she is talking about fields of knowledge and their strategic relations and tendencies, which is more like bourdieusian. I don´t think all the sociological leads to a greedy reductionism, at least not Bourdieu´s relationism. In fact, i think the problem is that Nick is somehow applying the very infamous early-latourian laboratory operation -or something near that-, so to embrace his standpoints: the 6 propositions are the proof of it. - Comentado por Naxos en:
- Politics and greedy reductionism
- November 1, 2009 7:08 AM
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@nsrnicek RT @nsrnicek Two questions: (1) Are two galaxies colliding in the vast emptiness of space, political? (2) If yes, how?
re:Yes, because such an event was researched so to be known & experienced as a positive knowledge through the technology that is capable to do it, & through the people with the professional skills to determine it as a scientific truth & also as a fact, not only in the history of humanity but specially in the history of the discipline that holds such positive knowledge: technology & people, that are both actually payed with certain funds that would not exist if the colliding event would not be relevant to politics or if such an event would be not political. I am afraid that you are willing to see the event itself as a being that is not conditioned by the humans nor their history nor their politics, that is part of a reality that is natural & independent from them, which is like saying that you only want to see this event in terms of an isolated object. But this objectual reductio which is finally invented on the base of the factual existence of a being which natural reality we are not already sure to know, or that is meant not to be known with the knowledge we have so far, is something too comfortable to take as a human-political-independent reality, mostly if considered that the colliding of two galaxies in the vast emptiness of space is not merely an object but an event that has its own affirmativeness & that might even have its complex reasons to happen, what ever these reasons might be, & therefore because of these complex reasons, it might have lots of relevant relations empowering its own material reality.
The problem is 1) if we are willing to take the question as something eventual that happens in fact, & then when it happens & as we get to know it, it irremediably becomes a political question such as all facts are, or 2) if are we willing to see & to take what we think of such event as an object.The problem is 1) not if such an event exists independently from human reality, the problem is 2) if we are able & capable as researchers to reach the reality of that an object, & i mean not it if we even have the knowledge to understand such an event, but if we have the knowledge-of-the-political-implications of our own specialized knowledge, exercises, practices & disciplines, a) regarding to other kind or related knowledge, exercises, practices & disciplines b) regarding to our fields of action, & of course as well, c) regarding to the people & its social sensibility.
The problem is 1) if we have objectified our position & trajectory in the fields we are working on & have worked on through our careers, regarding to the position & trajectories of our collegues & adversaries who are working in the same fields that we are, even though they might be working in something else, & all this so to avoid e.g. to use & abuse of the knowledge of such an event, even in the exercise of our professional practice, & to make not that knowledge end as a weapon or as an ideological dominancy. All this 2) if it is the case that we have taken the correct routes of our knowledge to understand “objectively” such an event, because it might be the case as well the we might have taken the routes inside our own discipline that would not lead us to understand it, & rather also might have filled us with all kind of pre-notions & pre-sumptions regarding to the object we are referring to, either because of the vices & shortcuts that point to all what we have taken for granted about our knowledge & practice, to what makes the sense of such practice & gives us the scholastic view of it as self-evident & the natural way to do things inside our fields.
#addendum To make the proper objectivification of our position, exercises, & trajectory in our disciplinary fields, its needed to effectuate epistemological ruptures as part of the methodology that would make us approximate to our pretended object: this means that we need to drop out certain & concrete things that are settled in & related to our knowledge & to the knowledge of our practice & discipline, things that we presume useful to make such an approximation. Of course I am not only referring to establish a moral rupture regarding to our personal beliefs & atavisms, but mostly to the embodied skills & schemes that constitute our sense of practice which implies the blinded spots that we all have embodied because all of the obvious things that we have taken for granted while exercising our practice.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- twitter.com/Naxos
- On Friday 30th October 2009 10:26am
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- [Tweeting molecules of the day]:
01:20 finally @ home #
01:36 i assisted to DeLanda´s conference at the Centro Nacional de las Artes & i was great listening to him: kind of funny to hear him in spanish #
01:40 unfortunately i couldnot tweet something about it because could not capture any wifi around, besides i decided to take video using my Nokia #
01:44 twitpic.com/kow7y – i was right in front of him, so took some nice shots #
01:46 twitpic.com/kowe8 – Manuel joked a lot while speaking as usual, with very intelligent humor ;-D #
01:54 at the end of the conference i could speak to DeLanda for quite a long time and have some tequilas at the post-party event, he is great #
01:56 we talked about three hours, almost of everthing: even i could express mi ideas abt his work, & accepted and confirmed some of my points #
01:58 he soon broke the ice of formalities and have an excellent totally open and frank conversation, i never expected that it would be that way #
02:00 twitpic.com/kox92 – here i am with him drinking tequila at the party ;-D !! #
02:08 DeLanda is a highly open minded person & his deleuzean materialism is totally alive: he offered me his friendship, so i had a great time
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- [Tweeting molecules of the day]:
06:11 i´ll be assisting to Manuel DeLanda´s conference at the Centro Nacional de las Artes tinyurl.com/y8bjep2 #
06:12 my problem is that while I admire his work, it also annoys my social sensibility.. I don´t know if i should try to ask him a sort of things #
06:15 the point is that the more i read about his fantastic work the more i see he is too pleasant with the endogenous scientific discourses.. #
06:20 i have to say that this is nothing personal with Manuel: i feel this kind of annoyment also with Badiou´s & with Latour´s standpoints #
11:52 ok lets see: I ranted how Delanda annoys my social sensitivity as i find he is too pleasant w the current endogenous scientific discourse.. #
11:53 & I also said that this is the kind of annoyment that I also feel mostly in relation with Badiou´s & Latour´s work & tendencies #
11:53 to my mind this has to do w their pragmatic departures as they cut on purpose the social relevance that might be implied by their own work #
11:54 by doing this they make their work circulate in the scientific fields which discourse is refractive 2 any social or political questionnement #
11:54 i was saying that philosophy is meant to respond firstly to social questions, and not only or exclusively to the scientific ones #
11:55 & that is annoying 2 see how these guys cut this relevance just to figure & to feed the hermetic illusion of an absolute scientific autonomy #
11:55 while this autonomy is meant also to be philosophically questioned.. #
11:55 the solution of my problem w Delanda suddenly came while thinking how the discourse implied in his work is diferent from Badiou´s & Latour´s #
11:56 the way DeLanda is introducing his idea of assemblage in2 these endogenous scientific fields is quite positive in comparison with these guys #
11:56 eventho such idea is not condescend with all its original foucaultian-guattarian-marxian discoursive-subjective-economic implications #
11:57 the fact that DeLanda insists in referring such idea as deleuzean, endorsing it2 Deleuze work is sthing very positive at the end of the day #
11:58 eventho its radically diff from the original term agencement: not 2 say how 2 my mind its almost another totally different conceptualization #
11:59 the fact that Manuel proposed a "new" social philosophy right after proposing his philo of virtual science is another (+) thing to consider #
11:59 this means that he isnot cutting all the social implications of philo but introducing them in2 these refractive fields but in a pleasant way #
12:00 in the way these fields would accept such subversive intervention as part of their hermetic philo-delusional-autonomical-discoursive effect #
12:01 in comparison w Badiou&Latour its 4sure DeLanda is still considering the social & introducing it w/o selling his soul 2the scientific fields #
12:02 altho this comparison can be unfounded regarding 2their respective specific "text": DeLanda´s pragmatic interest is not signed as impotency #
12:03 of course these 3 philo-figures, their trajectory & position are diff from each other: but still oriented to please these scientific fields #
12:04 Badiou´s depontencialized non spinozian anti-relational resentful philosophy is all the way coopted by the sci-field institutional effect #
12:04 so Badiou emerges himself as the analytical philosopher of impotency: a philosophical sentinel of the bureaucratic scientific institution #
12:05 2this point, Latour´s anti-social de-humanized standpoints are situated in the middle of the philosophical & sociological discoursive fields #
12:06 his views´r born as a systematic counter-argumentation against the bourdieusian pov: so4him the social is a laboratory invention of the text #
12:07 while bourdieuian analysis imply a relational politics of the fields Latour´s easyways mean a politicized associations of objectual networks #
12:08 instead DeLandas pov is still situated as part of the sociological fields despite he divides relations in interiority/exteriority mechanisms #
12:09 thus, DeLanda´s philo of assemblages is still to introduce a reductive reminiscence of the social into the hermetic scientific discourse #
12:09 despite his theory reveal not the conditions of production of such sci-fields & makes no harm 2 the illusion of its absolute autonomy effect #
12:10 to my mind, compared w Badiou´s & Latour´s work, DeLanda´s philo of assemblages remains propositive as it doesnot give the back to society #
12:11 of course, within these critical reflections that I am sharing & broadcasting now, the annoyment is now transformed in a positive way
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Hi, Michael, I read you. I have to say that by introducing Bourdieu to this issue I just to wanted to point out that while doing this OOP practice, and despite you may think that your or anyone else`s politics should not dictate OOP`s ontology: it is the practice by itself that is already dictating it, because doing such practice implies this bourdieuan idea of sense practique: which is referred to all the things that are taken for granted and reproduced blindly in the exercise of such a practice. This points out to the scholastic vices that are reproduced in the philosophical field. So, talking about ethics and politics: it is needed to exercise the objectivification of the practice, instead of exercising the reproduction of the vices it implies, as they are so taken for granted, and this, to objectively avoid their reproduction and institutional perpetuation in the field. The sociology of Bourdieu is relational and allows us to think this problems mostly concerned to the logic of practices. Bourdieu himself denounced all these problems all through his work: and he even talked specifically about the philosophical and the scientific fields. So to my mind, Bourdieu`s work implies a relational ontology that is referred to the social, and that should be considered ontologically. The problem is, that this kind of consideration may imply by now a subversive content inside of the philosophical fields, as it is meant to put on the table the conditions of production of the philosophical discourse.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- OOP between Politics and Ethics
- October 4, 2009 at 5:01 pm
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Hi, I have to say that this issue is very important. I think that any philosophy that wants to deal with ethics and with politics needs to embrace the question “who” and the question “how”, so to let its ontological departure grasp its own ethical status. So who is doing philosophy and how this philosophy is done? What is the ethical status of an ontology and how does this ethical status affects or should affect the philosopher that is formulating it? In the case of any philosophy: would not this ethical status affect the philosopher in the way that it shall be also an applied criteria to who is coining it, and in the sense to let him/her exercise a healthy objectivification of his/her practice, the practice that is actually giving birth to such an ontology? Regarding to the quote that points out to “the claim that questions of ontology are distinct from questions of politics”, and despite it also affirms that such a claim “is not equivalent to a rejection of politics”, i truly think that this statement of distinction should be also questioned by the one who is doing philosophy and that is coining an ontology that hopefully will be further referenced on his/her behalf, mostly if such ontology is pretending to introduce and not avoid the ethical status it implies at the end of the day. To my mind, any ontology that wants to introduce the ethical question and that may want to deal with the questions of politics, in order to not to fall into a naive statements, should start to question this ontological distinction, as this distinction is all the way concerned to these questions as well. In the original post written by Levi Bryant and that is linked here, I made a critical comment regarding to this specific issue, pointing out how Levi falls into this kind of ontological naivety. While the comment was frontal, frank, and with no harsh, unfortunately, Levi decided not to publish it as he meant to take it personal, even though i begged him not to take it like that. Obviously, the comment was certainly criticizing and pointing out, from a perfectly exposed bourdieuan point of view, to the lack objectivification of his practice as a philosopher that proposes (not without a bit of irony to my taste) an object oriented ontology (OOO). So Fabio, just to show how these kind of issues are indeed related to ethical and political struggles (in this case, the unpublished comment is the perfect example of it) I would like to have your permission to post my comment in this section, as it is worth to do so and to read regarding to the issues your are posing here. Anyway i will understand if you consider that it is not the case to go that far. cheers
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- OOP between Politics and Ethics
- October 4, 2009 at 1:02 pm
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For me, the sort of dialog I search for is the sort where others bring their own thoughts or associations to the table with respect to their own work, or where productive questions asking for clarification are posed helping me to further develop my thought.
If that is so, why you did not publish the comment i made about the naivety you carry regarding to the questions of ontology and the questions of politics? http://is.gd/3W2wI The comment was clear, neat, and with no harsh: i even asked you take it not as personal, but i guess you did. So we have to say then that your are not interested in comments that are contrary to your assertions and expose such assertions as very prudish and naive in their fault, even if that comment are wielded for your own objective sake. You may want to read it again, Levi http://is.gd/3W2wI and…
I take it that real critical work occurs in articles and books, not in this sort of medium.
If that`s so, why are you defending yourself so fiercely in this sort of medium, investing so much time on it, draining all your abilities and rejecting all the affects that are involved by doing so? Oh well, you might be ascribing yourself to what Graham Harman just posted about the blogosphere interactions and critical interchanges, just like waving him as if you had learnt the lesson through his reprimand. But you have not. You are clearly ashaming him, thats for sure, and you will still. Once more, you may want to remember my comment ( http://is.gd/3W2wI ) as the proof of your Self Oriented Ontological Naivety (SOON).
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- For Reid
- October 4, 2009 at 9:27 am
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Levi, I can recognize that the whole defense of your claim is supported by the idea that:
questions of ontology and questions of politics are distinct.
Then you spare a complement to this assertion saying that what this distinction:
entails is that ontological questions are not to be decided on political grounds.
These two assertions, far from being really true, their distinction is just pronouncing something that, in general, is not meant to be taken as something purely related to ontology itself. Of course it is expected from philosophers to take for granted the arguments that give autonomy to their disciplines and practices and that give sense to their views and therefore, while exercising this philosophical practice, that present as such like something meant to be embodied and naturalized, in order of course, to develop academically what they do as they are meant and expected to know how to do it. But in the real world, and to this point any realist ontology is included, to affirm that the mentioned questions are distinct, is something very naive. But why is naive? To say that these questions are distinct is a must-be that can only be applied and can only makes sense to philosophers, of course: as it is a very important and elemental part of the practical interests they share inside their field: the field of philosophical production. But outside this field, in the real word, this issues do not apply nor make the same sense, for example, to a sociologue. If you can notice, this specific issue it is by itself political, it remarks by itself a political ground that is already determining the production of philosophy in academic terms. This means that the autonomy that holds the field of philosophical production is relative and not absolute. The effect of any field of production, in this case, the effect concerned to the inner coercions of the philosophical discourse above the production of philosophical contents (and to my guess, I have to say, that you pronounced perfectly when saying rigorously that
The questions of ontology are internal to ontology.)
..is what gives an objective foundation to the illusion of an absolute autonomy, in order to separate, for example, what it is not philosophical (what is not ascribed to certain philosophical traditions and therefore, is taken as subversive), from what it is philosophical and serves academically to the conservation and perpetuation of the field and its discoursive production and reproduction. This means indeed a double rejection: the rejection of the philosophical contents that recuse the illusion of the absolute autonomy, in one hand, and in the other: the rejection of any other external content which mainly will reduce the philosophical production to the conditions of its own production and reveal all this conservative and rejective mechanisms.
So, as I have said before, its very naive to say that these questions are distinct as if they were distinct by their nature. But why is naive? As i am trying to get clear through this comment, from a discoursive point of view everything is political: this is meant to say, that everything that means something is irreversibly political. So, taking this point of view as valid for the present disoursive departure, would not be ontology something political as well? or better would not be this particular philosophical discipline something political per excellence, as it is meant to mean what is meant to mean (so far, let say, what it mean as “being”)? So again, to say that these questions are distinct is just naive and, as i have explained here, this is the kind of naivety of a philosopher that does not establish the right margins concerning to what he/she do at the time of what he/she says to do, actually, or in other words: the naivety of the philosopher that does not any objectivification of his/her exercise and therefore that is blinded by his/her own sense of practice while he/she is in fact practicing it. Further more, what should be expected at least as something to state with a bit of hesitation (and i cannot read anything of it in your post, on the contrary, you don`t allow anyone to doubt about your primal argument while you reproduce it with rigor and without noticing the intellectual and prude naivety it implies) is to say that the questions of ontology *should be* internal to ontology itself. But we don`t receive that vehement and honest reflection from you as philospher that suits the philosophical investiture (although it could be the inversed situation: i mean, that the philosophical investiture is suiting you from behind without you getting to notice) no! we receive the philosophical subjectiveness brought and sponsored by your lack of objectivification (which is something interesting to get to note for a philosopher that promotes the OOO`s stuff). To this point, considering that you are a sensitive philosopher, I beg you not to take this as an attack to your person, on the contrary: while i am being faithful to my points of views, the points of views that you are starting to know, I am just pointing out to a constructive critic on the table, for you philosophical sake.
So it is still naive to say that these questions are distinct, if we suspect that there might be prominent cases in history as well, where the ontological questions were suspiciously decided by the political questions. I guess the most representative example of this might be Heidegger, but not I am not very sure. As you might know better than me, or might not, i don`t really know (I am not fond on Heidegger`s work, sorry) and while i don`t avoid either that all this kind of strange suggestions can always be refuted as a rumor, which is ok to me (but then again if that is so, it would not change anything of what i just said above): it is well known then even as a rumor, that Heidegger`s philosophy did struggle with his nazi beliefs and commitments, and this was somehow reflected in his ontology. Just to take a possible and a tentative example: one might think that his tendency to germanize traditional philosophical terminologies through a series of almost never ending variations and declinations that the beautiful and ductile German language allows to compose, may be something that show us how his work was influenced by the nazi regime, of course, in order to institutionalize and naturalize their philosophical fascism. Or even out of the text, talking discoursive: his final reactive deception against the vulgarization of nazism, which made him take write and publish other kind of philosophies at the end of his days (on Nietzsche, for example): this is also something that may show us his huge influence in the philosophical institutional academical tendencies (this time for good and in a positive way to philosophy itself, i may say). Anyway if so, this specific case might be examplificatory in both ways i have exposed: in one hand, to say that the distinction between the ontological questions and the political ones is rather the refractive effect of the illusion of an absolute autonomy in the philosophical fields (as Heidegger was, by the way, one of the most prominent institutional sentinels and coiners of academical autonomy, and all his political-ontological mastery points out to build this refractive illusion). And in the other hand: to say that he never could hide his political commitments with nazism (while his infamous reactionary case makes us doubt about the statement that holds that the questions of ontology are purely internal to ontology).
To this point you now might wonder: where in hell all these presumptions that i am sharing here actually come from? I then i answer that they are not presumptions invented by me: all these things that i have written can be read and easy deduced from a very little book titled “The political ontology of Martin Heidegger” wrote by Pierre Bourdieu. So while i know with full certitude how you might not be aware of this book, i thought then how interesting it would be, at any rate of course, to show you how, if we give the bourdieuan point of view the authority it actually deserves, you are deeply and blindly reproducing the ontologically naivety song i have described so far regarding to the questions of ontology and the questions of politics, even with their own supposed “distinctiveness”.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- A Brief Note on OOO and Politics
- October 2, 2009 at 8:07 pm
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Mikhail: Thanks for giving @onticologist the status his work deserves. Thanks for giving us this humourous intellectual enjoyment. You can restore your twitter account any time with the same email address you used when registered the first time. It would be cool to have your rustiness over there again. Come on! PD I am writing this comment while taking a bath, playing the piano and eating pinole
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Objectology™ In Action
- October 1, 2009 at 5:48 pm
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- [Tweeting molecules of the day]:
12:26 @mosabou i have read your minimal ontology 4 times and i think it responds to the question i made about fractals and their social influence #
12:27 @mosabou the way ur reasoning draws the fractal movement to describe the minimal relations is neat, detailed & very temperate to my mind #
12:27 @mosabou we are able to say now that a fractal ontology can only be proposed and understood as an ontology of minimal relations, thanks to u #
12:28 @mosabou thXs4 giving Spinoza the authority that he deserves: its clear that granpa can still light up the most obscure places of impotency #
12:28 @mosabou ThX4 using Badiou´s depotencialized authority:now i know we can use him2 demonstrate things by default thru his ontological defects #
12:29 @mosabou ur minimal ontology is dynamic& w infinite movement while his ontology of the multiple is static& refracted ad infinitum, petrified #
12:30 @mosabou the minimal sacrifies itself to give birth to relationality in the most spinozian way, so to trace the diagram of social influence #
12:30 @mosabou while reading, Deleuze & Bourdieu came to my mind in terms of what relations can bring to intensities & strategies (respectively) #
12:31 @mosabou Deleuze can give the isolated relations its virtual & vital status if we take the void as a full filled space i,e. as the outside #
12:31 @mosabou Bourdieu give the reflexive relations its constructive opus operatum &dispositional modus operandi -to grasp the logic of practices #
12:32 @mosabou i enjoyed when u use the 2nd part of Deleuze´s book on Spinoza 2affirm the parallel of each minimal relation & to introduce affects #
12:32 @mosabou there is no doubt that ur minimal ontology is a flat ontology in the only way a flat ontology can possibly be: the spinozian way #
12:33 @mosabou (btw, it was precisely Deleuze´s book on Spinoza what i suggested @onticologist to study if he wants 2talk abt any flat ontology) #
12:33 @mosabou w elegance u disparage correlationism as a-relational coz it strangulates relation in a very trans-objective & object-oriented way #
12:34 @mosabou there is no way that ur minimal ontology could not be the most respectable to SRs like @doctorzamalek @onticologists & the others #
12:34 @mosabou u have no idea how I appreciate ur trust in me, to estimate ur work, so to let me know who is who regarding to this matters ThXS;-) #
12:35 @mosabou for me ur work is the reference i needed to take a clear & critical standpoint in respect to the existent philosophical discussions #
12:35 @mosabou u detected me, and so i am here responding & showing my respects to u and to ur manners and attention: u knew i was a minimal guy #
12:36 @mosabou these´re my appreciations. i feel inspired to write s/thing in terms of Bourdieu´s concept of habitus, thinking abt 2the Appendix.. #
12:36 @mosabou but i really dont know if i can make it for sure, as I still get very troubled while writing
however, i think i´ll try anyway #12:37 @mosabou thanks again for letting me know
#12:44 @sdv_duras this one ur.lc/and ;-D !! #
12:55 → On Minimal Relations:
I. The Ontology of Relations in Aristotle and Spinoza
Moses A. Boudourides @mosabou!! ur.lc/and #13:15 beautyful spinozian fractals tinyurl.com/ycej378 tinyurl.com/yb9ke72 tinyurl.com/y8dbfuz #
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Just as a final thought i would like to say that Bateson`s thought keeps on pointing out to the question that those things that are unknown could be known if we learn how to know them, or if we learn how to unlearn the things that we have already learnt about them. I don`t know if this is worth to say that he is agnostic, i guess not. To my mind, the fact that we cannot access to objects or to entities just as they are (or to their *being*) and the fact that we can only access to their transformations instead, if so, it is a condition of knowledge and not its limit. Thanks for the great conversation
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Object-Reality Interdependence
- 24 September 2009 @ 9:53 pm
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Hi John
I don`t like to label the thought of a thinker because for me it can only trouble the understanding of his work. It is useful for other kind of practical questions that for me are somehow unnecessary. So I will not be or pretend to be the one to say rightfully anything about that matter, as my way of appropriation is already coined with a different intention and approximation. This consideration is not something personal, it is just the way thought is meant to be deterritorialized, so labeling or trending an author is related to another kind of movement that it presents for me as a regression and therefore I am not willing to exercise. I just want to make this very clear and straight, while there is no intention to be harsh or to dismiss your worries.
What i can say is that in the case of Bateson the problem implied was really never solved for him: he tried to give response to it using Jung`s insights regarding to the pleroma/creatura question. This question leaded him to think such problem, but he never took a concrete standpoint, so for him the problem was not solved. But this is not to say, of course, that he did not solved because of his incompetence, all the contrary: we can take for sure that if he did not solved this matters was either because we don`t have the way to solve them, or because they are not *meant* to be solved (this might be like saying that the problem is deeply related with *meant*). By non taking a standpoint Bateson is given the proper sense to the question, so far: that this problem is the hugest asylum ignorantie of all times for human intelligence, and mostly for scientists. With his non standpoint he suggested that non of the scientific realities that we know so far would solve it. So he gave a lot of anecdotal winks to think that the problem is still not well put, that we *really* don`t have the ways to put it well, and to formulate it in the proper sense.
One of this anecdotal winks is related to his experience with LSD. He said that he experienced LSD just once but personally i find this hard to believe (that`s my very personal and intimate hunch). The important issue to this matter is that he did admitted that he used it once, and to my mind this admission needs to be taken as a complement or a wink to the unsolved problems that we are speaking here. The anecdote is that when he took LSD, while seeing a carnationand hallucinated on it -i cant remember the details, sorry- he said to the person that was with him something like: “This is trivial”. We can say that what ever he was experimenting then was just the way he thought that thought would access to objects and entities without any *real* codification, this is, the way that thought would access to their transformations, impacts and forces (so, if it is trivial is because we can access to them just as they present to our experiencie as patterns and flowing differences). Once again, there is no reason to think that he was naive to this question.
Hope this will help.
cheers
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Object-Reality Interdependence
- 24 September 2009 @ 5:18 am
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Your welcome!
I would like just to extend what I can understand about Bateson`s views as they are very interesting to this matters, although they are still very rigidly posed regarding to theory of systems and cybernetics. First of all, i have to make the clarification that, as i remind it, when Bateson says that a difference that makes a difference is a bit of information, he is referring to a “bit” more like a particle or a minimum of data that passes through the circuit, this is, as a flow of differenciation given between systems in the middle of their assemblage. This is to say that, while it may be needed a receiver to traduce such minimum data, the impacts and the forces or events that imply the process will remain on their course (this is like saying that the systems do not have, as their primary goal, the reception of the differences that they produce, as these differences are already “happening”). The receiver would be more like the mere consequence of an effect through the process. So information is not meant to be transmitted as such, it just happens right through the interjection of systems. The fact that there may be entities to receive this information in order to codify and be qualified by their own difference and by their own given difference, is something that has less to do with the process: its just the effect of the process, as this process is simply occurring and forming, deforming, and transforming such entities as the matter of fact that animates their own materiality. So the information resulted must be seen as a part of the existence of such entities, as it is meant to in-form their existence, but not as part of the dynamics of the system that incidentally produce the process that differenciates them as such. Entities may also not be pretty aware of such transformations, as they are inserted in the environment (the system) that gives sense to their differenciations and that leads them also to “be” a part of such a system (this does not mean that the system would crash without them, as all systems are always a part of other systems that are bigger and therefore capable to contend any differenciation or pattern).
What happens in between these dynamic-system-insertions, is what Bateson calls a “mind” or a “mentality”. Just to bring here one of his examples: he says, for instance, that a computer can be a mentality while it is inserted in the intellectual system of a biological system that is inserted in an environmental system of a climate system that is inserted in a planetary system of a solar system inserted in the cosmological system of a universal system of systems (and, all these systems are processing the differenciations of such a mentality, as they are also capable to contend, in respect to their different levels or circuits, the information that such mentality needs to exist). Of course this is very batesonian LOL. (btw, in his book Chaosmosis, Guattari refers to Bateson as one of the first deterritorialized thinkers to think the notion of deterrorialization, although his cybernetics insights were still very anthopocentric).
So, trying to respond to your question, I think that it can only be meaningful to speak of information from the point of view of the receiver, but the receiver is fully dependent of the process where it is inserted as an entity. Information is the difference that makes a difference that happens between the systems where the entity that receives and bolds such difference is inserted. So there is no intentionality here: if an entity is up to interfere with its process, or would pretend to change the system produced by it, it will only interrupt it or block it, in the sense that its own intentionality would be against it, though without bringing any substantial change into the system, and without changing the transformations impacts and forces that give sense to what in fact the entity “really is” through the process implied by such system. What it may change is the reception and codification of the information that is traduced in respect of their own process of differenciation. I guess that this (in)differentiation is what we may call “volition”. We can say that volition and its subsequent interference always would double-bind the process of differenciation and would block the flows of the differential circuit. This actually happens because volition and the double bind situations that it implies, are also a component of the way humans biological systems learn, or to say, of the way the have learnt to learn.
But at the end of the his life, Bateson gave a final definition of a double bind situation, and this definition resolves what clinically is still known as a sort of schizophrenic process: he stated that the double bind situation is related to the way that human biological systems are meant to learn to unlearn what they have learnt, and this points out to take learnship into a further level of experiencie to experiencie the surrounding enviroments where they are inserted in as such. This should be taken so far as the heart of his ecological take, of his ecology of the mind. Of course, this shall be something of interest to everyone, even to Dejan
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Object-Reality Interdependence
- 24 September 2009 @ 2:45 am
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Great. Following Gregory Bateson, “a difference that makes a difference” is not an object: regarding to his views “a difference that makes a difference is a bit of information”. So this is to say that we can`t have access to things themselves, we can only have access to their correspondent idea, to the idea of their idea, i.e. to their proper transformations, impacts and forces, and therefore, to the differences that pass through a differential circuit of differenciation. As far as i understand Bateson`s deutero-learnship, this circuit leads to different levels of experiencing environments, as we can get adapted to them only by taking into account not objects and their problems, but their “class” or type. To this matter Bateson follows Korzybski, in the sense that all we can experience and understand is deferred from its reality as language is always indirect to its own self. The class or type of problems that it may present to our experience and that are meant to be experimented through different environments, are always “more” than the class or the type of problems that we have already learnt. This means that the differential circuit would always get into differential patterns and to differential intensities to be equalized & ionized meanwhile they are embodied through experience.
Those were my two cents to the question
cheers
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Object-Reality Interdependence
- 23 September 2009 @ 5:43 am
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The point is that I seriously don`t think that you can hold your accusations sticking strictly to the whole frame of work of this specific authors, and I mean envisioning it in such a way to demonstrate the procedure that you have followed to assert the sense that trend them as idealists or anti-realist.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 09:43 am
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oh come on, I really can`t match where Foucault holds in such terms what you have asserted, and I feel I have to do so in order to follow closely your presumptions. But if you are going to say that I am trolling this conversation, you can always go back and read my extended comment that i bothered to write as a sign of my good will into the question.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 09:21 am
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ok, right. thanks for the reminder. but what if someone like me that has shown some of the knowledge regarding to these authors, doubt of yours as I am doing now? Is it not worthy to give an extended and detailed argumentation, not to presume it, that`s a surplus of course, but to show and expose the floss of the reasoning that lead to conclude what you only by now are still holding more as a hunch or presumption?
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 07:52 am
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And by the way, regarding to a healthy objetivification of the philosophical practice, that I somehow mentioned and suggested you to contemplate in my first comment, if you don`t mind:
The Scholastic Point of View
http://tinyurl.com/krjekrThis will help to let know that i was not being uncivil at the end of the day:
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 09:18 am
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Besides, I am afraid that you are not quite following me correctly: where did i suggest “that one can only respect a work or body of work when one refrains from disagreeing with it or critiquing it”? I do think that -for disagreeing- it is needed to know the whole work of an author, at least to be serious,and just as a matter of honesty, so to accomplish the right to speak about it, in favor or against him, mostly if such an author is accused and trended without any elaboration.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 08:55 am
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“Foucault holds that we can only relate to being in terms of discourse and power, and cannot know anything of being apart from discourse and power.”
Can you say where exactly he says that so? and I mean, exactly in such terms? i.e “holds”, “being” I cant remember where he says that, and i am very familiar to his work. The terms “being” still sound tricky. We really want to read your foucaultian and bourdieuan style. I did so, would you?
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 08:55 am
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Actually I would have no problem with your fast-track definition, if it is the case that you could get generous and elaborate with hairs and details all the important things that would show us how dominant you are, regarding to Foucault and Bourdieu`s line of thought, and how you overflow the whole frame of their work -and i mean, seriously, as your accusation might get pretty much graver than it is if you don`t do so (at the time that we might think then that you are not capable to demostrate it because of a sort of very specific reasons)-.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 08:52 am
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No, I am not.
I am seriously saying that they are not idealist as you accused them.
So, do you think that it is enough just to say -begging us to believe in you words just without any elaboration- that for Foucault and Bourdieu the tricky “being” is not thinkable apart from the human?
Are you capable to elaborate your assertion speaking about what you know about their frame of work, and i mean, taking their whole frame of work, if it happens that you know it and domain it?
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 09:18 am
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Oh well, Levi..
So “being” is like the keyword here is not it? and i mean the *tricky* one. All that i wrote there is like saying that the keyword -that you just imposed to your commentators- just would not fit in the frame of Foucault`s and Bourdieu`s work. “Being” is just out of the question for them. So therefore, I guess we all here tramped in your textual *tricky* “keywords”. OK.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 07:32 am
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ok,
I will try to express why I don`t agree with the accusation of idealism that you wielded to Foucault and to Bourdieu. It should be a good exercise for me. This has to do a lot with the way you utilized such an accusation to make your point, what ever this point was anyway.
For instance, regarding to Foucault`s work, you did not consider that, by the time he was proposing his nietzschean views concerned to The order of things, he was one of the first thinkers to say that the man was a recent invent in history and that as such he will not pervive for too long, or that he will just do as long as the historic block or epoch pervive -as you might know, am referring to the episteme that sediments the knowledge that gives sense to the idea of man-. I guess this is a good argument to say that he was not an idealist. Then, you did not consider how influenced Foucault was in respect to his nietzschean views, mostly, in respect to all what he could say, think and work, regarding to the dissolution of the subject. You did not consider that Foucault was very concerned not to be asked who he was (he famous “don`t ask me who i am”) and, within this concerning, his effort to propose his genealogy as the method to erase the prominence of man, and to think history without such prominence. You did not consider that all this effort leaded him to think and to grasp, as a very novel abstraction by that time, all what he proposed & developed about discoursive practices: for instance, his theory of enunciation, which is kind of difficult to follow -without mentioning the subjectiveness that enunciation meant for him as a sediment of knowledge, mostly speaking about what he referred to discoursive sockets, or to truth as a functor of knowledge that has nothing to do with what any man can say but to the conditions of its possibility, its historical apriori, and all that stuff-. But all this needs to be contextualized properly so to not let us reduce his views through the retrospective effect, and so to happily avoid easy accusations. So, if we consider that all his early efforts were mostly moved by his nietzscheanism (this is to say that his genealogical point of view was also meant to be put on as a practice above the prominence of humanity and its representations, in order to question them through analytical exercise, through an analytical toolbox, a toolbox that lead him also to think power, for instance) and mostly with the idea of the dissolution of the subject and the event in the nietzschean sense (that was by the way against sartrian consciousness and even against levistraussian structure -if so-) if we consider all this, its very easy to find how unfair is to say, at the end of the day, that he was an idealist.
But my rant was not meant to refutate your accusation, even though it is refutable concerning to all this things that i am saying now. My rant was referred to your argumentative and pragmatic manners (and if u dont want to publish this comment because I`m touching this matter, its ok, i understand, -spotting myself here is not quite my goal-, but anyway, I have to say that I will post it in the blog that i have in wordpress, which is a special blog where I collect all my commented stuff on the blogosphere, so it is nothing personal). Regarding to this question , for example: you did not bother to give sense to the effort that Foucault did back then at his time to grasp what we all now know it is his thought, as many times he stated: a thought-in-progress, a thought that never pretended to do objectivist theories, but a thought to put in practice thought itself throughout a variety of analytical departures to think concrete problems. With your accusation you cutted all this sensible foucaultian context, and the reason that u did that is because you are very used to take the work of an author, his thought, and his efforts, as nothing more than a text. You are not very worry to embody what you take of an author, you just use it, which is more like to say, that you don`t know it, but you manage it in a very bureaucratic way. The infamous “what can i do with this phrases, with this assertions, so to feed my textual proposes and demonstrations, so to wield them or not against this or that consideration, so to use it fruitfully to construct or destroy” is something that is for you the order of the day. You are so used to this manners that you don`t even notice this scholastic vice, which by the way, it is perfectly exposed precisely by Bourdieu. Bourdieu criticizes the way scholars reproduce their scholar views as the view that they give sense to their own endogenous & common practices, without doing any healthy objectification of such views an practices.
But why to accuse? what is the point to stigmatize as “fat” to who is “fat”? what for? Is not this a terrible manner to make a point, somehow ad hominen claim to separate tendencies and to take parties just to suit an pompous investiture, just to feed a personal trend negatively by the defect of others? (and I`m not saying that your are accusing as idealist who is actually an idealist, in the case speaking of Foucault or Bourdieu they are not, so to my mind, you are so mistaken for double: 1. using the accusation as a way to demonstrate whatever you need, and 2. accusing who does not deserve such accusations). So, as you abuse of your textual tendencies, as you are doing this in a way of a sort of mercenary textual practice, you are not willing to consider that Foucault and Bourdieu walked rather different paths than the ontological ones: they had social commitments that nowadays are still very up to be respected at any rate. Here your pragmatic response or your axiological blindness would sound like “but i dont care, as i am only interested in ontology”. But this interest of yours is not enough argument to sustain an ethical standpoint to accuse them, it just does not justify the “civility” such accusations. “Oh well, what do you expect, if i can only see thing right through my navel”: this neither justifies your pragmatic manners, nor your ways to state your points: with a little bit of intellectual humbleness you may want to objectify your practice, your textual manners, your intellectual procedures, so to take account of them doing the proper margins, and in other to take the positions that you are willing to take in the philosophical fields, as something that shall be very useful to your ontological concerns. (At this point, you may now say that i am trespassing the line between civility and uncivility: but i am not, am just wielding back to you what is meant to be taken beyond the text, as a foucaultian and bourdieuan point of view: so, as u can see, am putting that in practice here or at least am trying to do so, so to ask you what do you expected of a foucaultian or bourdieuan, if being foucaultian or bourdieuan lead to this way to put things and denounce the blindness that they imply and mean by themself, so to take them better through their own discoursivity and sense of practice?).
In respect to Bourdieu, it is sort of the same considerations that should be applied on his defense, regarding to your manners. But for instance, i can say that he denies to take things that easily. Bourdieu`s work is a constructivism-structuralism, but its also meant to be taken as a strategic relationism: he denies the prominence of the man, as he does not consider any actors or actants in the way that Latour does -thought, am not very familiar with Latour`s standpoints-. Bourdieu proposes socioanalysis using a conceptual machinary that lead us to think and to value the logic of practices, this is, from a very macrosocial point of view. His conceptual frame of work is related to the notion of habitus, in one hand, and to the notion of social field of production, in the other. Now you might say: “gotcha! correlationism!”, yeah it might be, but the dynamics that he proposes between these two conceptualizations are not meant to be taken as something centered in an human ontology. The bourdieuan habitus is a notion meant to rupture with realism naivety, with psychologisms, and with the objectivist positions that cannot reach the logic of the social because they overflow “ontologically” their relations, and when doing so, they also fall into a rampant subjectivity: an endogenous social insight. Certainly, the habitus is a system of relations that is embodied within its practice, a system of skills and schemes, ways of views that are meant to reproduce the know-how of practices in respect to their consequent fields, the fields that are accordant to those skills, schemes, know-hows and social points of view. This is to say, that the habitus breaks with the notion of awareness and intentionality of the actor, the subject and the individual, while it introduces the idea of agent (agency) that can be either singular, collective, or institutional. The habitus has a reproductive component that assemblages with social space in many ways and with its categories (that are also reproduced, and embodied). But the habitus can be shared through different individuals, so to say, that you share the same or similar habitus with any else that has the same or similar trajectory that you have, that has the same or similar conductive patterns of action, that has the same or similar tastes, the same or similar education, that has the same or similar position in the social space -family and parents as its departure- , that went to the same or similar school -and coursed the same or similar lessons-, that frequent the same or similar bars, that presume the same or similar way to think. To this point it is hard to think that could be another guy very similar to Levi Bryant doing the same or similar things that you doing (oh god no please!), but the habitus allows us to comprehend such “coincidences” and to understand, for example, the non spoken criteria to select who is a good candidate to be spoused, or to explain the conditioned reasons of a divorce. As u can see, this is the heart of bourdieuan socioanalysis, and socioanalysis is the main work of Bourdieu: his theories of symbolic power or symbolic violence are just a tasty complement to the whole of his work, as they explain the doxa and its ideologies, etc etc. At this end, the last thing that it is important is if he is an idealist or not, and I am sure that if you would know all this, and take it in consideration, you would not use him as an example to wheel your accusation. The same with Foucault.
So, even if you still manage to demonstrate that they are idealists, which would be something very stubborn to my mind, very forced if so, and even if you manage to demonstrate, of course, with all the proper respect that they deserve about their work, and with all what you might know about such work -giving tribute to your effort, energy and time invested to do so-, and even, with all that you surely know that is left to know or you don`t actually know by now about such work as well -as an exercise of intellectual frankness and humility- even if all that, you will find, at the end of the day, that they were never the good and clear example that you needed to hold your disparaged points. So, as you might see, this is were honesty and unwillingness should be admitted or not as part of the scene.
So this is my take on the question. I hope this writing is enough to stand some points, and forgive my broken english.
cheers
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 21, 07:09 am
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Oh well, no surprise. It is needed be brave and to publish the kind of comments that reveal all the unwillingness of your blogging manners and all your lack of seriousness with philosophy. The one I sent you a few hours ago is one of those ( http://is.gd/3toCI ). Of course you would not publish it because it has no real textual content that you can twist and turn into the usual replying boomerangs that you like to wield to your readers. You may feel kind of frustrated, as usual. This was of course premeditated on my part, as i was referring discoursively not to the great Text that you are always pleased to reterritorialize, but to your reactive and resentful blogging manners that characterize your person. Your are too predictable, mister, nothing brave:
RT @Naxos: of course, he will not, but lets see if Mr. Levi Bryant has the balls to publish my comment http://is.gd/3toCI
about 2 hours ago from webYou may want to back off doing prudish assertions about the philosophers that horrify your OOO explorations and that you don`t know or even manage, and I mean Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze, Foucault, and Bourdieu. Just as a healthy recourse and for the sake of your own intellectual trajectory.
You may not take this addendum as a comment.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 20, 12:52 am
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To acuse Foucault or Bourdieu of idealism is simply not knowing what their work was all about. For instance, Foucault`s work is not only referred to power: in the case of such thinker, it is needed to have a broader idea, the whole picture of his work, so to trace the movement of his thought-in-progress that brought all sort of problems into the table. Once again you dismiss what other philosophers have said about Foucault`s work (eg. Deleuze). You may have read a lot of him, but to conclude that he is an idealist is also to conclude that you have wasted your time reading him as you did not understand anything of his genealogies. While you are not capable of giving the sense of what you have studied about him, at the time that what you have said does not show anything of it, we can think that you are just not being honest about what u know of him.
If it is the case that u could speak about the whole work of an author doing the proper digestions about what their different thought are all about, then we can give some credit to your great tout-court assertions. Meanwhile we can take this statements -as well as many others- as just a pretext to hold your decontextualized points, as the pragmatic manner to give your arguments the effect of a temperated reasoning, on the way to feed your OOO presumptions. This is like very cheaty for you and for anyone.
The same can be said concerning to what you said about Bourdieu`s work. I am pretty sure that you have no idea of his work,. that you don`t understand nothing about it, and that your are just using him as an example of what you cannot demostrate with arguments. But you felt confident to put him near Foucault to insist in the dismissive effect of your re-textualized reasoning (as you thought that any of your readers would not complain).
To my mind, you speak and write too much, your paranoic race to get things written and to demonstrate your points within this reactive blogging manners just can show us all the lack of patient and digestion you have regarding to authors and their work.
For example, you insist in saying that your ontology is deleuzian, and you defend it as a flat ontology. But there are not signs of any spinozian influence in your idea of flatness. You might say, “Oh but I am not interested” “Oh, but my work goes in another direction” “Oh, i don`t give a damn”. This pragmatic sense of doing things is the lowest way to do philosophy: this form of “what to do with an author” or “what shall I write about this work that I don`t even quite understand nor find useful to my selfish concretions”, all this way to utilize the substantial materials of thought, makes philosophy a selfish joke. I guess that`s why most of your readers enjoy reading your post as a soap opera or as a philosophical morbosity. Personally i enjoy all your philosophical blockages.
But to say that your ontology is deleuzian, and to claim it seriously as something worth to appropriate as yours, you have to be delezean, my friend: you have to embody the minimum of deleuzian experiencie in your life, if so. But your are not a bit deleuzian, your are fully lacanian. How can you compose and conciliate your lacanian influence with the assertion that your ontology is a flat and delezean one, if you just keep cutting the influences that leaded Deleuze to speak about immanence in the most spinozian way? You really must be joking, its never to late to accept it.
If u want to hold and embrace your ontology as flat and as deleuzian as you insist fiercely to say, you should take seriously the spinonizan influence on Deleuze and not to fake it in their name. Or for instance, at least, you can give some sense to the part II of his book on Spinoza and expressionism, where he states all the basic lines to understand and to work on any flat ontology.
- Comentado por Naxos en:
- Eliminativism
- September 19, 9:46 am
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Thanks @anodyne2art !!!
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